

4 Generating single coefficients for groups of variables

In the micro-level equations predicting individual consciousness we are not interested in the separate values of the coefficients for each of the class location dummy variables (which measure the difference between that class location and the left-out category), but rather with the overall effect of class location as a variable (i.e. with the effects represented by the entire set of class location dummy variables). In the presentation of the results, therefore, the eleven individual coefficients are replaced with a single standardized regression coefficient representing the combined effect of class location. This substitution is accomplished by estimating the OLS regression equation with the eleven dummy variables representing class location in the standard way and then constructing a new variable which is the weighted sum of the unstandardized coefficients multiplied by each of the class dummy variables. This variable is then substituted for the original set of dummy variables in the equation and a new equation estimated. In this new equation the aggregate class location variable will always have an unstandardized coefficient of 1.0. The standardized (beta) coefficient for this variable indicates its relative explanatory power compared to the other variables in the equation. The R^2 for this equation is exactly the same as in the original equation with the eleven dummy variables.

A similar procedure is adopted to generate single standardized regression coefficients of the joint effect for the variables within each of the broad groups of variables used in equation 2: *past class experiences; current class experiences and material conditions; demographic variables; country*. These consolidated coefficients facilitate comparisons of relative explanatory power across groups of variables, both within countries and across countries.

15 Class, state employment and consciousness

In Chapter 14, I argued that one of the crucial factors underlying the different patterns of class formation in the United States and Sweden was state employment. More specifically, I argued that state employment may help to explain the greater ideological demarcation between the middle class and the capitalist class in Sweden by reducing the material dependency of a significant segment of the middle class from the capitalist class. In this chapter we will pursue these issues in much greater detail by examining a broader range of indicators of consciousness and a more differentiated account of state employment.

As many commentators have noted, one of the most striking developments in modern societies is the growth of the state. Whether measured by the proportion of GNP that is appropriated by the state in taxation, by the range of social and economic activities in which the state plays a significant role, or by the size of state employment, the state in every industrial society has grown enormously over the past 100 years.

Given this massive growth of the state, one might have thought that the empirical study of the attitudes and ideological orientations of state employees, and especially the differences between attitudes of state and private sector employees, would have become a significant focus of sociological research. This simply has not occurred, at least in the American literature. There are, of course, numerous case studies of the practices and ideologies of people in specific state agencies (schools, police, the military, the courts, etc.). There are countless studies of such things as the transformations of state institutions, the social and economic impacts of state policies, the decisionmaking processes within the state, and the relative autonomy or nonautonomy of state "elites" from manipulation by outside forces. There is a veritable

industry of "bringing the state back in" which argues that the institutional properties of state apparatuses and the strategies of state managers are central determinants of state policies. And while there is much historical and sociological writing that discusses interests and ideologies of people in the top political directorate of the state, the research that explores these issues for ordinary state employees and compares them to comparable employees in the private sector is extremely limited.¹

This lack of sustained attention to the mass of state employees reflects, I suspect, the common tendency among political sociologists to regard the state either as an organization instrumentally controlled by directing elites (whether that elite be viewed as top level state managers, professional politicians or a ruling class outside of the state itself) or as a matrix of apparatuses with a particular institutional structure. However, "the state" is no more simply made up of elites and apparatuses than capitalism is made up solely of capitalists and firms. Just as it is essential to understand the forms of consciousness and strategies of workers and managers in order to understand the dynamics of capitalist firms, so too it is important to understand the ideologies and strategies of the mass of state employees and officials in order to understand the internal dynamics of states. Because of their role in the practical implementation of state policies, this is especially important for the case of what I will call the "state middle class" – the broad ranks of experts and bureaucrats in the state between routinized state workers and state "elites."² Any comprehensive sociology of the

¹ There are a few studies which compare ideological orientations of state and private sector employees in the context of some other agenda of analysis. In particular, some empirical studies of the "New Class" (e.g. Brint 1984; Ladd 1979; Wuthnow and Schrum 1983) have included some marginal analyses of attitudinal correlates of state employment or occupational "government dependence" (to use Wuthnow and Schrum's expression). These studies, however, did not systematically explore differences between state employees and private sector employees outside of the New Class, and even the discussion of state employment differences within the New Class was quite cursory. The few studies directly on the topic of state/private comparisons have quite narrow empirical focusses and are generally on very restricted samples (for example, Bennett and Orzechowski 1983; Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1980; Rainey, Traut and Blunt 1986; and the qualitative interview study by Reinerman, 1987). I found no studies which systematically explore a general array of attitudinal differences between employees in the state and private sectors and no research at all which explores the interaction of class and state employment, let alone research that has looked at these issues cross-nationally.

² I will use the rather vague term "state elite" to designate the top directorate of state institutions. By using this term I am not taking a theoretical stand on the question of

state must attempt to understand the interests, strategies and ideologies of the state employees who actually do the work of the state.

The overarching empirical question which we will address in this chapter is quite simple: are there systematic ideological differences within and across classes between the state and private sectors of employment? More specifically, we will examine two clusters of attitudes – attitudes in support of increasing state intervention to solve various social and economic problems (to be referred to as "prostatist consciousness") and attitudes in support of workers in conflicts with employers and critical of existing economic institutions (to be referred to as "anticapitalist consciousness"). The statistical task of the research is to see how these two clusters of attitudes vary (1) across state and private sectors of employment; (2) across class locations within state and within private sectors; and (3) across sectors within classes.

The next section will briefly explore the concept of "the state" as it bears on the problem of the interests and consciousness of state employees. Section 15.2 will then lay out a series of orienting hypotheses which will guide the empirical investigation. Sections 15.3 and 15.4 will then present and interpret the results of the data analysis.

15.1 Conceptualizing state employment

In the general model of class structure and class consciousness in Chapter 13, class consciousness was seen as shaped by the material interests and lived experiences of individuals by virtue of their class locations. Here we are exploring one additional set of material conditions which impact on lived experience and interests: the nature of the employing organization in which people work. There are many ways in which one could differentiate employing organizations: large corporations vs. small firms, firms in different economic sectors, etc. In this chapter we will focus on only one theoretically salient distinction: state vs. private sectors of employment. The underlying assumption is that individuals employed by the state potentially have different material interests and lived experiences from individuals in the private capitalist sector even when, in other respects, they might be thought of as in the same class location.

whether or not this elite constitutes a "class," a "fraction" of a class, or an elite outside of class relations. Such questions can be bracketed in this chapter since our empirical focus is exclusively on the working class and the "middle" class in the state and private sectors.

The simplest way of approaching this problem would be to treat state employment itself as a unitary category. There are, after all, certain things which nearly all state employees have in common simply by virtue of being employed by the state. Above all, their wages are largely paid out of taxes, and thus they have a different relationship to private profits and public taxation than employees of capitalist firms. In many cases state employees also enjoy various forms of legally backed job security unavailable in the private sector. One might expect, therefore, that the crude distinction between public and private employment by itself could constitute a significant division of material interests and, correspondingly, consciousness.

A more complex perspective sees the state itself as internally divided into apparatuses which have quite different functional relationships to the capitalist economy. Specifically, instead of treating "state employment" as a unitary category, "the state" can be divided into two broad kinds of apparatuses: the *capitalist political superstructure*, and *decommodified state services*. The first of these sectors consists of those state institutions within which the "function" of reproducing capitalist social relations is particularly important.³ This includes such apparatuses as the police, the courts, the administrative organs of government, the military, the legislature, etc. This does not imply that the sole function of these institutions is sustaining capitalism, or even that in every situation capitalist reproduction is their primary function. What is claimed, however, is that under most conditions the functional relation between the state and capitalist social relations in these institutions is particularly important.

In classical Marxism, the entire state apparatus was viewed as constituting such a superstructure. Indeed, in the most extreme interpretations, this was the only important function of the state. Most contemporary theorists in the Marxist tradition no longer analyze the state in such stark, unitary functionalist terms. The state is seen as fragmented in various ways, with different types of apparatuses organized around different principles. In particular, it is possible to identify a subset of state apparatuses which are sites for the direct

³ The use of functional language to describe properties and activities of the state is fraught with difficulties. I am not suggesting here that there is any homeostatic mechanism which guarantees that these specific apparatuses of the state will effectively perform these functions. All that is being claimed is that in addition to whatever else they do, these apparatuses generally play a particularly important role in sustaining capitalist social relations.

production of use values – goods and services which meet people's needs of various sorts. State apparatuses which specialize in such "decommodified" (i.e. nonmarket) production would include, above all, such things as public health, education, publicly owned utilities, public recreation. Rather than being viewed as exclusively part of the *political superstructure* of capitalism, such institutions should be regarded as also constituting elements of an *embryonic postcapitalist mode of production* located within the state.⁴

Of course, many state institutions combine both "functions" – contributing to the reproduction of capitalist social relations and satisfying human needs of various sorts by producing decommodified goods and services. For example, Marxists have often argued that education is, in certain respects, part of the ideological superstructure of capitalism insofar as it tends to propagate ideological orientations compatible with capitalism. Social welfare agencies may simultaneously provide real services to satisfy people's needs and reproduce capitalism by blocking alternatives. Nevertheless, it is possible to loosely distinguish between those state apparatuses within which the superstructural aspects are particularly strong and those within which the production of goods and services that satisfy people's needs is particularly central.⁵ The latter we will refer to as *the state service sector*, the former as *the state political sector*.

⁴ These institutions are *post-capitalist* because the production of the goods and services in question follow a distinctively noncommodified, noncapitalist logic. The production is not oriented toward exchange or profit maximization, but toward the direct satisfaction of needs. This means that the quantity and quality of the products and services are determined through a fundamentally *political process* of contestation rather than through a market. To be sure, within a capitalist *society* such production will be highly constrained by capitalist institutions, and thus it is appropriate to call this an *embryonic* state mode of production rather than a fully developed one existing alongside capitalism. Nevertheless, to be constrained by a capitalist logic is not the same as having a capitalist logic, and it is for this reason that state-centered politically mediated production can be viewed as postcapitalist. For a further discussion of these arguments, see Wright (1994: ch. 6). A similar, although not identical, distinction between different types of state institutions has been made by Hoff (1985). This distinction, however, is quite different from that of Louis Althusser (1971) in his famous essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses." In Althusser's analysis both the "repressive apparatuses of the state" and the "ideological apparatuses of the state" are characterized exclusively as serving the function of reproducing capitalist relations.

⁵ The distinction between these two "functions" performed by state apparatuses – superstructural functions (reproducing capitalist relations) and productive functions (producing use-values) – is not identical to another common functional distinction Marxists sometimes make in discussions of the state: the *legitimation* function and

The core data analysis in this chapter revolves around the interaction of state employment and class location in shaping consciousness. Within each of the two subsectors of the state it is possible, in principle, to define the same matrix of class locations as we have been exploring among employees in the private sector. Unfortunately, because of the relatively small sample size of state employees, especially in the American data, for the data analyses here we had to combine all of the "contradictory locations" within class relations into a single "middle-class" category. The resulting set of categories we will use in the chapter are presented in Table 15.1.

15.2 Orienting hypotheses

This research on state employees was not initially orchestrated as a "test" of precisely formulated contending hypotheses about how ideological orientations should vary by class and employment in state and private sectors. Given the lack of sustained attention to the subject in the literature, the research was basically exploratory and inductive rather than driven by an attempt at adjudicating between well-established rival theories. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to lay out the broad outlines of what might be termed "orienting hypotheses" derived from the conceptual framework that informs the analysis.

The central empirical objective of the research is to map out ideological differences between incumbents in the categories within Table 15.1 on the two dimensions of ideology we are considering, prostatist consciousness and anticapitalist consciousness. Of particular importance are the bottom two rows in the table, since for these categories we can explore both class differences within sectors and sector differences within classes.

There are many reasons why one might anticipate ideological differences to occur across the categories of these tables. People in different class-by-sector categories could have very different interests (material as well as nonmaterial interests) by virtue of the constraints

the *accumulation* function (e.g. Offe 1984; O'Connor 1973). Some productive functions may not serve any particular needs of accumulation as such – for example, public provision of recreation facilities; and many state practices subsumed under the rubric "legitimation functions" may involve substantial production of use-values by the state. These are thus cross-cutting functional descriptions used for different analytical purposes.

Table 15.1. *Social structure locations used in analysis of class and state*

Class location	Private sector	State sector	
		Political superstructure	Decommodified services
Capitalist class	Capitalist class		
Petty bourgeoisie	Petty bourgeoisie		
Middle class	Private sector middle class	State political middle class	State service middle class
Working class	Private sector working class	State political working class	State service working class

and possibilities they confront, and these interests could in turn underwrite different ideological orientations. Or, people who end up in different categories could have been subjected to different forms of indoctrination during their upbringing and education. Different employment settings could be characterized by conditions encouraging different degrees of cognitive complexity or generating various forms of cognitive dissonance which in turn would affect ideological dispositions. More broadly, the "lived experience" within different kinds of work settings shape ideology. It could be the case, for example, that the experience of "alienation" in the work setting is systematically different for the working class and the middle class in state and in private employment, and that this difference in alienation experiences underwrites different ideological orientations. For all these reasons one might expect attitudes toward the state and classes to vary across the class-by-sector categories we are exploring.

Because of their heterogeneity and complexity, it would be difficult to generate a set of *a priori* predictions from this broad set of causes. We will therefore limit ourselves to one specific causal connection, that between the material interests of actors and their ideologies. This need not imply a mechanical theory of ideology in which consciousness is derived simply from such material interests – many other causes can intervene to break this relation – but it does suggest that one should not be surprised when such correspondences exist.

In terms of the categories in Table 15.1, the problem is thus to figure out how material interests of actors vary across the class-by-sector

categories and how this might impact on ideological orientations. The interpretation of our empirical findings will revolve around three propositions concerning the linkage between location, interests and ideology:

Hypothesis 1. Within each sector, people in the working class should both hold more prostatist and more anticapitalist attitudes than will people in the middle class. Workers are more vulnerable to the vagaries of the capitalist labor market and thus in general should be more supportive than the middle class of an expansive role of the state in society. Also, because the material interests of workers are more sharply polarized with those of capital than are the interests of the middle class, one would expect workers to be more supportive of working-class struggles and more hostile to the capitalist class than are people in the middle class. While the degree of such polarization might be greater in the private sector, within each sector for both of these ideological issues we would thus expect workers to be to the left of the middle class.

Hypothesis 2. Within the middle class, people employed in state services will hold more prostatist attitudes and more anticapitalist attitudes than will people in either the private sector or the state political superstructure. The argument for a division in interests between the middle class in state services and the private sector is fairly simple: since the interests of the private sector middle class are more closely tied to those of the capitalist class than are those of the middle class in state services, we would expect the private sector middle class to be more procapitalist. In a complementary way, because of their dependency on state employment, we would expect the middle class in state services to be more prostatist. But what about the middle class in the state political superstructure? Why should they differ ideologically from middle-class employees in state services? The argument here centers on the functional linkage between the state superstructure and capitalist interests. The middle class in state superstructural apparatuses plays an active role in managing the programs in the agencies within which they work. To varying degrees this involves limited forms of policy-making and planning as well as authoritative roles in implementing policies. If we are willing to assume that to at least some extent functional roles are causally linked to ideological orientation, then because of their role as managers and experts in apparatuses functionally important for capitalist relations, we would expect the middle

class in the state political superstructure to be more procapitalist and less prostatist than the middle class in state services.⁶

Hypothesis 3. The working class in the state sector (either in the state superstructure or in state services) will be more prostatist than in the private sector, whereas the working class in the private sector will be more anticapitalist than in the state sector. By virtue of their employment in the state, the interests of state sector workers confront the interests of capitalists in a less directly polarized manner, and thus they would have less reason to be anticapitalist. On the other hand, because their welfare directly depends upon the vitality of state employment, they would tend to be more prostatist. Unlike in the case of middle-class state employees, because state sector workers have no role in controlling the policies and programs within the agencies in which they work, there would be no particular reason to predict strong ideological divisions among workers within the state.

The overall expectation of the variant of neo-Marxist theory adopted here, therefore, is that (1) workers will be more statist and more anticapitalist than the middle class within all sectors; (2) the middle class will be ideologically divided across the two subsectors of the state whereas the working class will not; (3) the working class will be ideologically divided between the private sector and the state sector as a whole, whereas the middle class in the private sector and the state political superstructure will not differ ideologically. These expectations generate the rank orderings of expected levels of prostatist consciousness and anticapitalist consciousness in Table 15.2.

It could be objected that while these predictions may be reasonable, the explanatory principles behind them are quite wrong-headed since many of the people who end up in these various sectors already held these general ideological orientations *before* entering their specific jobs. It is certainly plausible, for example, that people seek out employment in state services as teachers or welfare workers because they already hold certain kinds of statist and/or anticapitalist values (whether for

⁶ There are a variety of causal mechanisms that might link functional roles to ideological orientation. The mechanism might be one of recruitment: only those people whose ideologies are compatible with the mission of a superstructural apparatus will be allowed to enter the apparatus or be retained once in. Or the mechanism might be rooted in simple material interests: the material interests of actors depend upon the extent to which an apparatus adequately fulfills its functional responsibilities, and ideological orientations tend to adjust to such material interests. On either grounds one would predict ideological divisions between state managers and experts in the political superstructure and in state services.

Table 15.2. *Orienting hypotheses of relationship between class, state and ideology^a*

Rank ordering for prostatism attitudes^b

Class	Sector of employment		
	Capitalist private sector	Political superstructure	Decommodified state services
Middle class	4	4	3
Working class	2	1	1

Rank ordering for proworker/anticapitalism attitudes^c

Class	Sector of employment		
	Capitalist private sector	Political superstructure	Decommodified state services
Middle class	4	4	3
Working class	1	2	2

a. Entries are predicted rank orderings of particular categories on the two dimensions of ideology. A rank order of 1 implies the strongest degree of support for the ideological element in question. When two categories are given the same rank ordering, this implies that there is no expectation that they will differ on the ideological element.

b. *Prostatism* = attitudes in support of increasing state intervention to solve various social and economic problems.

c. *Proworker/Anticapitalism* = attitudes in support of workers in conflicts with employers and critical of existing economic institutions.

reasons adduced by New Class theory, neo-Weberian theory or neo-Marxist theory). Instead of employment settings shaping consciousness, forms of consciousness may explain a process of self-selection of people into employment settings.

We will not, in the empirical explorations of this chapter, be able to sort out the micro-biographical issue of how individuals come to hold the attitudes they hold. This does not, however, undermine the arguments about the linkage between interests embedded in different kinds of structural locations occupied by individuals and those individuals' ideological orientation. Whether people are recruited into those locations because they value those interests already, or the locations engender a given set of attitudes by virtue of the interests linked to the location, specific patterns of ideological differences across classes and sectors would be associated with the interests tied to these social locations.

Suppose we observe that managers in state services are much more statist than managers of private business corporations, and further that they were more statist even before they entered these jobs. It would nevertheless be a mistake to conclude from this that the contrast in ideological orientations associated with the two sites of employment is simply the result of attributes of individuals alone (i.e. a "selection" effect of what kinds of people end up in given jobs). Even if middle-class people in state services were prostatist before entering state employment, the attributes of state service employment (and the interests linked to those attributes) would still be a central part of the explanation for why there are aggregate ideological differences between the middle class in state services and the private sector, since if state services did not institutionally embody these particular interests they would "select" people with different ideological orientations.⁷ Although important in its own right, it is thus not necessary to solve the problem of selection in order to explore ideological differences across social structural locations of the sort we are studying. Our empirical task, then, is to carefully map out the patterns of these ideological differences across classes and sectors and see the extent to which they conform to the various orienting hypotheses we have examined.

Hypothesis 4. The ideological division within the working class between the two state subsectors should be greater in Sweden than in the United States.

⁷ Selection in this context can operate through a variety of concrete mechanisms. It can operate directly in recruitment criteria by the hiring authorities at ports of entry to apparatuses. Or, if someone whose ideological orientation is incompatible manages to get hired, they might find their careers blocked by higher-ups in the apparatus. However, even if such screening mechanisms are weak or absent, voluntary self-selection can still accomplish a correspondence between ideological orientation of individuals and institutionally grounded interests.

Since in Sweden the postcapitalist decommodified sector of production (state services) is much more developed than in the United States, and thus constitutes a stronger material basis for distinctive interests of the middle class in that sector, it would be predicted that the ideological division *within* the state between the two subsectors of the middle class should be *greater* in Sweden than in the US. The two countries should not differ, however, in the ideological profiles of the middle class in the political superstructure compared to the private sector: in both countries there should be relatively little ideological division here.

Hypothesis 5. Ideological divisions across sectors within the working class should be weaker in Sweden than in the United States. The model of class formation in Chapter 13 suggests that when the working class is politically and organizationally weak, there will generally be more ideological divisions linked to divisions of *immediate* material interests than when the working class is strong. In the case of the US/Swedish contrast, this suggests that whatever ideological divisions do occur within the working class between the state and private sectors should be greater in the United States than in Sweden since the American working class lacks the kind of class-wide organization which would dampen such divisions. Hypotheses 4 and 5 together thus suggest an interesting pair of contrasts between Sweden and the United States: Sweden should have deeper ideological divisions within the middle class (between subsectors within the state) than the United States, whereas the United States should have deeper ideological divisions within the working class (between the state as a whole and the private sector).

15.3 Results

Our analysis revolves around two clusters of attitudes, "prostatist consciousness" and "anticapitalist consciousness." *Prostatism*, in the context of this research, refers to positive attitudes toward the expansion of interventionist activities of the state. *Anticapitalism* refers to attitudes toward class issues, especially class conflicts and the distribution of power and resources across classes in capitalist society. These are by no means the only kinds of attitudes which would be relevant to an analysis of ideological orientations. However, since we are particularly interested in the effects of state employment and class position on

ideology, these two dimensions seemed particularly relevant. The specific questions used to operationalize these two variables are presented in the methodological appendix to this chapter.

The essential task of the empirical analysis of this chapter is to see in what ways ideological orientations vary across the eight social structural locations in Table 15.1, and then to compare these patterns for the United States and Sweden. This involves conducting a large number of statistical tests of specific differences across the cells of the table. More specifically, we want to explore the following contrasts:

- 1 Within the *columns* in Table 15.2 (i.e. within the private sector, the state political superstructure and the state-service sector) are there significant differences in the ideological orientations of people in different class locations?
- 2 Within the *rows* of the table (i.e. within the different classes) are there significant differences in ideological orientations across different sites of employment?
- 3 Do these patterns of differences vary significantly between the United States and Sweden (i.e. are there significant differences between the two countries in the magnitudes of the within-sector class contrasts and the within-class sector contrasts)?

Table 15.3 presents the mean values on the ideology scales we are considering for the various class locations in the private sector, the aggregate state sector and in the two subsectors of the state (the state service sector and the state political superstructure) in Sweden and the United States. Table 15.4 presents a summary of the statistical tests of differences across class categories within sectors, and across sectors within classes for both of the dependent variables. Finally, Table 15.5 presents the tests for the differences between Sweden and the United States for a number of the contrasts presented in Table 15.4.

Two preliminary comments before looking at the substantive findings: first, while some passing reference will be made to the ideological orientation of capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie, because of the theoretical objectives of this chapter we will focus nearly all of our attention on the contrasts involving the working class and the middle class – i.e. those class locations found within both the private and state sectors. Second, the samples are relatively small for the state political superstructure categories: eighty-four in the United States (about 34%

Table 15.3. *Ideological orientation within class-by-sector categories in the United States and Sweden*

Class	Sector of employment				Row Ns
	Private	State	Subsectors within state		
			Political	Services	
Capitalist class	112				112
Petty bourgeoisie	110				110
Middle class	291	89	36	53	281
Working class	680	159	48	111	839
Column Ns	1184	248	84	164	1432

I.2. *Prostatism (cell entries = means on prostatism scale; range -3 to +3)*

Class	Sector of employment				Row means
	Private	State	Subsectors within state		
			Political	Services	
Capitalist class	0.85				0.85
Petty bourgeoisie	0.84				0.84
Middle class	1.03	1.26	1.05	1.40	1.08
Working class	1.64	1.30	1.26	1.32	1.58
Column means	1.35	1.29	1.17	1.35	1.34

I.3. *Anticapitalism (cell entries = means on anticapitalism scale; range -6 to +6)*

Class	Sector of employment				Row means
	Private	State	Subsectors within state		
			Political	Services	
Capitalists	-0.16				-0.16
Petty bourgeoisie	0.54				0.54
Middle class	0.09	1.04	1.14	0.96	0.31
Working class	1.68	1.75	0.98	2.08	1.69
Column means	1.02	1.49	1.05	1.72	1.10

Table 15.3. (Continued)

II. Sweden

II.1. *Number of cases in each class-by-sector category (weighted Ns)*

Class	Sector of employment				Row Ns
	Private	State	Subsectors within state		
			Political	Services	
Capitalists	61				61
Petty bourgeoisie	58				58
Middle class	123	149	22	127	272
Working class	405	309	33	276	714
Column Ns	647	458	54	404	1106

II.2. *Prostatism (cell entries = means on prostatism scale; range -3 to +3)*

Class	Sector of employment				Row means
	Private	State	Subsectors within state		
			Political	Services	
Capitalists	1.08				1.08
Petty bourgeoisie	1.54				1.54
Middle class	1.14	1.53	1.16	1.59	1.35
Working class	2.02	2.02	1.84	2.05	2.02
Column Means	1.72	1.86	1.57	1.90	1.78

II.3. *Anticapitalism (cell entries = means on anticapitalism scale; range -6 to +6)*

Class	Sector of employment				Row means
	Private	State	Subsectors within state		
			Political	Services	
Capitalists	-0.35				-0.35
Petty bourgeoisie	0.98				0.98
Middle class	1.01	1.66	-0.29	1.99	1.37
Working class	3.47	3.17	3.41	3.14	3.34
Column means	2.42	2.68	1.94	2.78	2.52

Table 15.4. *Tests of differences between classes within sectors and between sectors within classes*I. *Working class vs. middle class: significance of class differences within each sector*

	Working class vs. middle class in			
	Private sector	State political	State service	Total state
<i>United States</i>				
Prostatism	> ^a	=	=	=
Anticapitalism	>	=	>	(>)
<i>Sweden</i>				
Prostatism	>	(>)	>	>
Anticapitalism	>	>	>	>

II. *Capitalist class vs. middle class: significance of class differences within sectors*

	Capitalist class vs. middle class in			
	Private sector	State political	State service	Total state
<i>United States</i>				
Prostatism	=	=	<	(<)
Anticapitalism	=	<	<	<
<i>Sweden</i>				
Prostatism	=	=	<	<
Anticapitalism	<	=	<	<

III. *Working class: significance of differences across sectors within the working class*

	State service vs. political	State service vs. private	State political vs. private	Total state vs. private
<i>United States</i>				
Prostatism	=	(<)	=	<
Anticapitalism	>	=	(<)	=
<i>Sweden</i>				
Prostatism	=	=	=	=
Anticapitalism	=	=	=	=

Table 15.4. (Continued)

IV. *Middle class: significance of differences across sectors within the middle class*

	State service vs. political	State service vs. private	State political vs. private	Total state vs. private
<i>United States</i>				
Prostatism	=	=	=	=
Anticapitalism	=	(>)	>	>
<i>Sweden</i>				
Prostatism	=	>	=	>
Anticapitalism	>	>	(<)	=

a. *Entries in table:*

- > mean for first category significantly greater than the second category ($p < .05$, 2-tailed test)
- < mean for first category significantly smaller than the second category ($p < .05$, 2-tailed test)
- (>) mean for first category marginally significantly greater than the second category ($p < .10$, 2-tailed test)
- (<) mean for first category marginally significantly smaller than the second category ($p < .10$, 2-tailed test)
- = mean for two categories do not differ significantly ($p > .10$, 2-tailed test)

of all state employees) and fifty-four in Sweden (about 13% of all state employees).⁸ This means that for contrasts involving the middle class within the political superstructure the number of cases gets very small indeed in both countries (thirty-six in the US and twenty-two in Sweden), which makes formal statistical tests quite problematic. For comparisons involving these cases, therefore, I will adopt a fairly loose criterion for statistical significance, while of course regarding the findings as necessarily tentative.

Class differences within sectors

A number of findings concerning class differences within sectors are particularly striking. First, *within the private sector* in both the United States and Sweden there are consistent, significant ideological differences between the working class and the middle class on both the prostatism and anticapitalism scales: in both countries on average

⁸ It is worth noting that although the proportion of state employees in the political superstructure is much higher in the US than in Sweden, the proportion of the total labor force that is employed in the state political superstructure is quite similar in the two countries. This reflects the fact that the much larger overall state employment in Sweden is entirely the result of the expansion of decommodified state services.

Table 15.5. *Test of differences between the United States and Sweden in contrasts across class-sector categories*I. *Differences between countries in working-class (WC) vs. middle-class (MC) contrasts within each sector^a*

	Prostatism scale	p ^b	Anticapitalism scale	p
I.1 Private sector: WC vs. MC	0.27	<.10	0.87	<.01
I.2 State political: WC vs. MC	0.46	ns	3.87	<.01
I.3 State services: WC vs. MC	0.53	<.05	0.03	ns
I.4 Total state: WC vs. MC	0.45	<.05	0.80	<.10

II. *Differences between countries in contrasts across sectors within the working class*

	Difference between countries	p
II.1 Prostatism: WC in private vs. total state	-0.34	<.05
II.2 Prostatism: WC in private vs. state service	-0.35	<.05
II.3 Anticapitalism: WC in state service vs. state political	-1.37	<.05
II.4 Anticapitalism: WC in private vs. state political	-0.64	ns

III. *Differences between countries in contrasts across sectors within the middle class*

	Difference between countries	p
III.1 Prostatism: MC in total state vs. private	0.16	ns
III.2 Anticapitalism: MC in total state vs. private	-0.30	ns
III.3 Prostatism: MC in state services vs. private	0.08	ns
III.4 Anticapitalism: MC in state services vs. private	0.10	ns
III.5 Anticapitalism: MC in state political vs. private	-2.36	<.01
III.6 Anticapitalism: MC in state services vs. state political	2.47	<.01

a. Differences are calculated as Sweden - United States.

b. One-tailed test.

workers are more positive about state intervention and are more anticapitalist than are people in the middle class.⁹

Second, for the anticapitalism scale (but only marginally for the prostatism scale), these class differences within the private sector are significantly stronger in Sweden than in the United States (see Table 15.5, line I.1): the ideological difference between private sector workers and middle class on the anticapitalism scale is nearly 2.5 points in Sweden but only 1.6 points in the United States. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter 14, where we did not distinguish state and private sectors, that overall the Swedish class structure is more polarized ideologically than is the American class structure.

Third, in the United States *within the two subsectors of the state* - the state political superstructure and the state service sector - there are no statistically significant ideological differences for *statism* between the middle class and the working class. In Sweden, in contrast, there are significant differences on the prostatism measures between workers and middle class in the state service sector, and marginally significant differences in the state political sector.¹⁰ Furthermore, as indicated in Table 15.5, line I.3, the class difference within the state service sector in Sweden is significantly larger than the corresponding difference in the United States.

Fourth, in terms of the *anticapitalism* scale, there are strong class differences within both subsectors of the state in Sweden, whereas, in the United States, such differences only occur within the state service sector, not the state political superstructure. The class differences in anticapitalist class consciousness in Sweden are significantly greater than in the United States within the state political superstructure (line I.2 in Table 15.5).¹¹

⁹ In keeping with the results for the entire labor force as analyzed in chapter 14, it should be noted that in Sweden there is a significant ideological difference between capitalists and the private sector middle class on the anticapitalism scale, whereas in the United States the private sector middle class does not significantly differ from capitalists on this scale. In neither country do capitalists and private sector middle class differ on statism. The American middle class in the private sector is thus ideologically closer to the capitalist class than is its Swedish counterpart.

¹⁰ The actual magnitude of the difference in Sweden between middle class and working class is larger in the political sector than in the state service sector, but because the sample size is smaller, the class difference within the political sector is only marginally statistically significant.

¹¹ As explained in the methodological appendix, all of these comparisons were made both with the simple additive scale reported here and with more complex LISREL factor scales. There is only one instance where these scales yield different results in the analysis

Taking these various findings together leads to the following characterization of the class differences within sectors in the two countries. While generally speaking in Sweden there is a higher level of ideological polarization between classes in most sectors than in the United States, *in both countries, there is a higher level of class polarization in the private sector than within the state service sector.* To take one of the clearest examples, in the United States on the prostatism scale, the difference between the middle class and the working class within state services is only 0.08 on the scale (1.40 vs. 1.32), whereas the difference within the private sector is 0.6 (1.03 vs. 1.64). Similarly, to take an example from Sweden, the class difference within the state service sector is 1.2 on the anticapitalism scale compared to 2.5 for the private sector. The results for the state political superstructure are somewhat less clear on this score: in Sweden, particularly for anticapitalism, the state political superstructure is at least as ideologically polarized as the private sector; in the United States this is not the case.¹² In any event, state superstructural employment in both countries is a minority of total state employment (about a third in the US and an eighth in Sweden), so *within the state as a whole in both countries there is clearly less ideological polarization between classes than in the private sector.* These findings are broadly consistent with the expectations in Table 15.2.

Sector differences within classes

Now let us turn to the central question of this chapter, sectoral differences within classes. Two patterns stand out. First, the working class is much more homogeneous across sectors in Sweden than in the United States. In Table 15.4, panel III, there are no significant sectoral

of class differences within sectors: in the United States, within the state service sector, while the middle class and working class significantly differ on the additive anticapitalism scale (as indicated in Table 15.4), they do *not* significantly differ on the pronoun factor scale, one of the two LISREL factors generated by the items used in the anticapitalism additive scale. In no other result of class differences within sectors are there any discrepancies across the various analytical strategies we explored.

¹² The relatively high level of "progressive" attitudes by the political sector middle class in the US compared to Sweden (especially for the anticapitalism scale) seems to be partially the result of the attitudes of supervisors in state protective services in the US who on average hold relatively pronoun and anticapitalist attitudes (as measured by our questions). In terms of the class typology, these individuals are classified as skilled supervisors (marginal skill assets and marginal organizational assets) and thus were placed in the "middle class." The numbers, of course, are relatively small, so it was impossible to systematically analyze these respondents separately.

differences among workers in Sweden, whereas in the United States there are numerous cases in which sectoral differences are significant within the working class.¹³ To cite one example, on the anticapitalism scale, US workers in the political superstructure have a score of 0.98 compared to 2.08 in the state service sector and 1.68 in the private sector, whereas in Sweden the three values are 3.41, 3.14 and 3.47. As Table 15.5, line II.3, indicates, the difference between the US and Sweden for contrasts across subsectors of the state within the working class is statistically significant. The Swedish working class is thus more unified ideologically across economic-political sectors than is the American working class.

Second, when we look at the middle classes in the two countries, we get quite a different picture. In the United States within the middle class there are no statistically significant ideological differences between the two state subsectors. The American middle class thus seems to be ideologically divided between the private sector (quite conservative) and a somewhat more progressive, and relatively unified, state sector middle class. In Sweden, on the other hand, the state political superstructural middle class is not ideologically different from the private sector middle class (if anything it is marginally more conservative, as indicated by the anticapitalism scale), whereas the state service sector middle class is much more progressive than the private sector on both the prostatism and anticapitalism scales. The result is that there is considerable ideological division within the middle class *inside* of the Swedish state, particularly in terms of anticapitalism.¹⁴ Overall, then, the American middle class is more

¹³ There were two instances where the results using the more complex LISREL measurement strategy (see methodological appendix) differed from the results using the simple additive consciousness scale reported here: (1) In Sweden, workers in state services have a lower average score on the anticorporate capitalism factor than workers in the private sector, whereas in the additive scale these two groups of workers do not differ significantly; (2) in the US, workers in the state service sector had a significantly *higher* value on the anticorporate capitalism factor than workers in the private sector, whereas on the additive anticapitalism scale these two groups also did not differ. Nevertheless, the general observation still holds, that the working class is ideologically more homogeneous in Sweden than in the US across these sectors.

¹⁴ As in the results for the working class, there are some slight differences between the results using the LISREL factors (see methodological appendix) and the results using the simple additive scale: (1) in the United States, the middle class in the political superstructure has a higher value than the private sector middle class on the additive anticapitalism scale, but does not differ from the private sector middle class on the pronounism LISREL factor; (2) the Swedish state service sector middle class

ideologically homogeneous across sectors than the Swedish middle class. Particularly for ideological prostatism, there are no divisions at all within the US middle class, whereas the Swedish state service sector middle class is clearly to the left of the private sector middle class.

Taking the patterns for the working class and the middle class together, we can say that in the United States both the working class and the middle class are ideologically divided across sectors, but in different ways. In the US, the division between private sector, political superstructure and state services constitutes a basis for real ideological divisions within classes. In Sweden, on the other hand, this is only true for the middle class, within which there is a fairly sharp ideological division within the state and between the state and private sectors. The Swedish working class, in contrast, remains fairly strongly united ideologically across all of these sectoral divisions.

In terms of the expectations elaborated in Table 15.2, the Swedish picture is consistent with the prediction of significant ideological divisions across sectors within the middle class and only marginal divisions within the working class. The American results, however, are not fully consistent with these predictions. In particular, we did not predict that private sector workers would be *more* prostatist than state sector workers or that state service sector workers would be so strongly more anticapitalist than state superstructural workers.

Sector differences within classes controlling for attributes of individuals

A skeptic might challenge these descriptive results by pointing out that the differences across sectors within classes observed in Table 15.3 and tested in Table 15.4 could simply be artifacts of various kinds of compositional differences across these categories. For example, as Table 15.6 indicates, there are striking differences in gender composition across class-by-sector categories: in both the US and Sweden, 47% of the middle class in the state service sector are women, a much higher figure than in either the state political middle class or private sector middle class. Furthermore, there are big differences between Sweden and the United States in the gender composition of these latter two sectors: women constitute only 10% of the state political middle class in the US but 34% in Sweden, whereas they constitute 33% of the

has a higher value than the political superstructure middle class on the overall additive anticapitalism scale, but not on the pronoun LISREL factor. Again, these discrepancies in results do not affect the overall picture.

Table 15.6. *Percentage of women within class-by-sector categories*

Class	Sector of employment			
	Private	State	Subsectors within state	
			Political	Services
<i>United States</i>				
Capitalists	29.2			
Petty bourgeoisie	49.8			
Middle class	32.8	32.3	9.7	47.6
Working class	50.7	59.9	61.5	59.2
Column means	44.2	49.9	39.1	55.5
<i>Sweden</i>				
Capitalists	17.2			
Petty bourgeoisie	23.7			
Middle class	18.0	45.2	33.6	47.2
Working class	38.3	68.6	67.7	68.7
Column means	31.1	61.0	54.1	61.9

private sector middle class in the US compared to only 18% in Sweden. These are quite large differences across countries, and *if* much of the sectoral differences in ideology within classes within each country were attributable to (for example) gender composition, then this might also explain the differing patterns across countries.

In order to rule out this kind of spurious relationship between class-by-sector categories and ideology, I ran multiple regressions controlling for several variables which might generate such compositional effects: age, gender, education and income.¹⁵ It might seem that a fifth composition variable, union membership, would also be appropriate to include as a control. After all, union membership does vary across sectors and union members are ideologically different from

¹⁵ Income is measured as the natural log of personal earnings from the respondent's job. Education is measured as years of schooling in the United States and as level of education (a six-level ordinal scale) in Sweden.

nonmembers. It might thus be argued that the observed sector differences in ideology within classes could simply reflect differences in union membership. I have not, however, included union membership as a control variable in this analysis since union membership is just as plausibly a *consequence* of the ideological orientations of people in different sectors as a cause of such orientations, particularly in the United States. That is, the compositional differences in union membership across sectors are likely to be partially caused by our dependent variables (ideological orientations), and thus it is inappropriate to treat union membership as a control variable for testing the robustness of sector difference in ideology.¹⁶

The strategy for each equation was to create three dummy variables for the class-by-sector categories – two for the categories being compared and a third for everyone else. We then examined whether the difference between the categories of interest became statistically insignificant when the various controls were added to the equation. We are not, in these analyses, interested in the coefficients for the control variables as such; our only interest is in seeing whether or not the patterns reported in Table 15.4 remain intact when these controls are included in the equations. The results are given in Table 15.7.

The controls seem to affect the patterns for prostatism more than for anticapitalism. When the controls are added, the marginally significant differences between workers in state services and in the private sector in the United States disappear (see line I.1.2 in Table 15.7). For the middle class in the United States, significant differences emerge between state services and the private sector which were not present in the analyses without the control variables (see line II.1.2 in Table 15.7). The result of these two changes in patterns is that once the controls are added to the analysis, the across-sector patterns for the prostatism measures within both the working class and the middle class are virtually identical in Sweden and the United States.

In the case of the anticapitalism scale, in contrast, the controls, if anything, slightly *strengthen* the differences between the United States

¹⁶ When union membership is included as a compositional control in the multivariate equations, some, but not all, of the sector differences within classes are reduced. However, even when union membership is included, the basic substantive conclusion of the results reported above – that the US working class is ideologically divided across sectors while the Swedish is not, and the Swedish middle class is divided within the state while the US middle class is not – remains supported by the data.

Table 15.7. Tests for significance of sectoral differences within classes controlling for age, sex, education and income

	United States		Sweden	
	Direction and significance of difference between categories as reported in Table 15.4	controlling for age, sex education and income	Direction and significance of difference between categories as reported in Table 15.4	controlling for age, sex education and income
I. Working class				
1. Prostatism				
1.1 State service vs. state political				
1.2 State service vs. private	(∇)			
1.3 State political vs. private				
1.4 Total state vs. private	∇			
2. Anticapitalism				
2.1 State service vs. state political	∧	∧		
2.2 State service vs. private				
2.3 State political vs. private	(∇)			
2.4 Total state vs. private				
II. Middle class				
1. Prostatism				
1.1 State service vs. state political				
1.2 State service vs. private		∧		∧
1.3 State political vs. private				
1.4 Total state vs. private		(∧)		∧
2. Anticapitalism				
2.1 State service vs. state political		∧	∧	∧
2.2 State service vs. private	(∧)	∧	∧	∧
2.3 State political vs. private	∧	∧	∧	∧
2.4 Total state vs. private	∧	(∧)	∧	(∧)

See Table 15.4 for explanation of entries in table.

and Sweden observed in Table 15.4. For the American data, there is a stronger indication of ideological divisions in anticapitalist consciousness across sectors within the working class after the controls are added; for the Swedes the homogeneity within the working class is unaffected by the addition of controls. Within the middle class, adding the control variables increased the statistical significance of the contrast between state services and private sector for the United States (line II.2.2), while, again, the results for Sweden were basically unchanged. The central findings for the initial analysis of the middle class are thus confirmed: the Swedish middle class is ideologically divided between the political and service sectors of the state, whereas the American middle class is ideologically divided between the state as a whole and the private sector.

Overall, then, it does not seem plausible that the basic conclusions derived from Tables 15.3 and 15.4 are simply artifacts of the composition of the various class-by-sector categories. Even when controls for education, gender, age and personal income are included in the analysis, the Swedish working class appears to be more ideologically unified across these sectors than the American working class, and the Swedish middle class seems to be more ideologically divided within the state than does the American middle class.

15.4 Implications

While the data analysis in this chapter was not initially framed as a direct test of the hypotheses presented in Table 15.2, nevertheless the results are broadly consistent with these expectations. Table 15.8 reorganizes the results from Table 15.4 in terms of the rank orderings of different cells in our class-by-sector typology in a manner parallel to Table 15.2. The results for the middle class, especially for the anticapitalism scale, lend some support to the distinction between those state apparatuses which constitute the political superstructure of capitalism and those which embody elements of a decommodified postcapitalist form of social production. If this distinction designates different institutional functions and associated interests within the state, then it would be expected that employees in postcapitalist state services would be more progressive politically than employees in the political superstructure, and that at least middle-class state service sector employees would be more progressive than their private sector counterparts. These expectations are strongly supported for Sweden,

Table 15.8. Rank orderings of ideological orientation within class-by-sector categories in the United States and Sweden

I. United States	Two sector model		Three sector model		
	Private	Total state	Private	State political	State services
I.1 Prostatism					
Middle class	2 ^a	2	2	2	2
Working class	1	2	1	(2) ^b	2
I.2 Anticapitalism					
Middle class	3	2	3	2	2
Working class	1	1	1	2	1
II. Sweden					
II.1 Prostatism					
Middle class	3	2	3	3	2
Working class	1	1	1	1	1
II.2 Anticapitalism					
Middle class	3	2	4	3	2
Working class	1	1	1	1	1

a. Entries are the actual rank ordering of particular categories on the two dimensions of ideology corresponding to the predictions in Table 2. A rank order of 1 implies the strongest degree of support for the ideological element in question. When two categories do not significantly differ at the .10 level of significance, they are given the same rank ordering.

b. In this instance, the category did not differ significantly from any of the other cells in the table. Since the absolute magnitude of the value in this cell (1.26) is virtually identical to that in some of the other cells in rank 2, it seems appropriate to consider it a rank 2 category.

and at least partially supported for the United States. While in both countries the state service sector middle class is consistently more progressive than the private sector middle class on the anticapitalism scale, the state service middle class is sharply different ideologically from the political superstructure middle class only in Sweden. For the United States, therefore, the results for the middle class conform more to what might be considered a neo-Weberian expectation of an ideological division between state managers and experts *as a whole* and private sector managers and experts, whereas for Sweden, the results are consistent with the neo-Marxist expectation that there will be ideological differences within the state between the middle class in apparatuses which are primarily part of the political superstructure of capitalism and apparatuses which embody decommodified postcapitalist forms of production.

The results for the working class are also broadly consistent with the expectations of the variant of neo-Marxist class analysis we have been considering. In both countries, as expected, the working class is almost always significantly to the left of the middle class within sectors, and there is less ideological division across sectors in the working class than in the middle class. Furthermore, this relative ideological homogeneity is stronger in Sweden than in the United States. In every capitalist society a range of concrete circumstances of different categories of workers generates pressures toward variability in forms of consciousness within the working class. Among other potential divisions, the differences of interests of workers employed in the sectors we have investigated constitute one basis for such variability. In Sweden, the strength of the class-wide political and economic organization of the working class acts to at least mute, if not completely eliminate, such tendencies toward ideological divisions. In the United States, where class formation within the working class is exceptionally weak, there is much more scope for the development of distinctive ideological profiles based on differences of immediate interests tied to different sectors of employment.¹⁷

¹⁷ As has often been noted, the political conditions for working-class formation differ sharply in the two countries. Unlike in Sweden, there has never been a successful class-wide working-class political party in the United States. For a variety of familiar reasons – a much less favorable set of laws around unionization, the weakness of social democratic political tendencies, higher levels of geographical and social division within the working class, etc. – the working class in the United States is also vastly less unionized than in Sweden, and where unionization has occurred it has often served to increase divisions within the working class rather than mitigate

The state has been brought firmly “back in” to the agenda of sociological analyses of public policy, social conflict and social change. It still largely remains, however, outside the concerns of micro-level research in political sociology, social stratification and class analysis. The results of this chapter suggest, to use a favorite expression of neo-Weberian state-centered theorists, that “the state matters,” but it matters in different ways for different classes under different historical conditions.

Methodological appendix

1 *Dependent variables: prostatism and anticapitalism*

Three items were used to measure prostatist consciousness:

- 1 In order to reduce crime, education and job opportunities for the poor need to be increased. (Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?)¹⁸
- 2 The energy crisis will not be fully solved until the government controls the major energy companies. (Do you strongly agree, etc.?)
- 3 Do you think that the government should be spending a great deal more on education and health, somewhat more, the present amount, somewhat less, or a great deal less?

Anticapitalist consciousness was measured by the five items used in the anticapitalism scale in Chapter 14 plus one additional item:

Imagine that workers in a major industry are out on strike over working conditions and wages. Which of the following outcomes would you like to see occur:

- (a) The workers win their most important demands.
- (b) The workers win some of their demands and make some concessions.

them. Furthermore, the underdevelopment of the American welfare state means that many sources of individual welfare are tied to specific sites of employment rather than universalized by state provision. This again creates divisions of interests among workers with respect to the state.

¹⁸ While this question does not directly call for state intervention to increase education and job opportunities, I assume that most people who believe that increasing education and jobs would significantly reduce crime would support state intervention to accomplish this.

- (c) The workers win only a few of their demands and make major concessions.
- (d) The workers go back to work without winning any of their demands.

As in chapter 14, I experimented with a variety of simple and complex strategies of aggregating these items into analytically useful scales: constructing simple additive scales of the items; using ordinal probit analysis to assign magnitudes to the levels in the scales; constructing scales on the basis of confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL IV.¹⁹ It turns out that virtually all of the results are the same regardless of which technique was used and none of the substantive conclusions are affected by different techniques. I have thus decided to use the least complex of the scale construction techniques for this chapter, that is, simply counting the number of items on which a person takes a prostatist position or anticapitalist position. (I have indicated in footnotes the few instances in which a difference in the results would occur if one of the more complex analytical techniques were used.)

To construct the two scales, all of these items were trichotomized, with a value of +1 indicating the anticapitalism or prostatism response, -1 the procapitalism or antistatism response, and 0 the "neutral" response (generally, "don't know"). In the items with agree/disagree responses, we collapsed the "somewhat" and "strong" categories in each question in order to construct these trichotomies. The variable construction therefore differs from the strategy in chapter 14 in which each item was coded on a five-point scale from -2 to +2. Item 3 above was trichotomized by treating the middle response - "government should spend the present amount on health and education" - as the statism-neutral category of 0. In the item on strike outcomes, response category (b) - workers should win some demands and make some concessions - was considered to be a class-neutral answer, and thus

¹⁹ In the confirmatory factor analysis, the anticapitalism items were differentiated into two factors - a prounion factor (item 2 in the list in the methodological appendix in chapter 14 and the above strike outcome item) and an anti-corporate capital factor (items 1, 4 and 5 in chapter 14). Item 3 in the list in chapter 14 behaved quite inconsistently across the two countries and was thus dropped from the LISREL-generated scales. In the factor analytic treatment of the data, therefore, we investigated three different scales: prostatism, prounionism and anti-corporate capitalism. The technical details of the LISREL analysis are discussed in Wright, Howe and Cho (1989).

was given 0; the first category was given a value of +1; the third and fourth categories were combined as -1.

The scales were then constructed by summing the three prostatism items to form the prostatism scale (with values from -3 to +3) and summing the items listed in Chapter 14.1 and the strike outcome item to form the anticapitalism scale (with values from -6 to +6). When there were missing values for some of the items used to construct these simple scales, we calculated the mean value of the items for which we had valid responses and then multiplied this by 3 (for the prostatism scale) and 6 (for the anticapitalism scale). We thus replace missing values by the best available estimate based on the mean value of valid responses.

2 Independent variables

1 *Class location.* The "middle class" will be defined as everyone who is a manager, an expert or a skilled supervisor. All other employees are considered in the working class. The "working class" in this analysis thus includes the pure working class plus those "contradictory class locations" with the strongest working-class characteristics - nonskilled supervisors, and nonsupervisory skilled workers. This corresponds to those locations in the class structure which constitute the core of the "working-class ideological coalition" in Chapter 14.

2 *State sector vs. private sector.* All respondents who said that they "worked for someone else" (rather than being self-employed) were asked whether they worked for a government agency, a nonprofit organization or a profitmaking business. In Sweden they were given one additional response category, "government industry." State employees are operationalized as all respondents who say that they worked either for a government agency or government industry.

3 *State political superstructure vs. state services.* The distinction between those apparatuses in the state which constitute the "political superstructure" of capitalism and those which constitute the "service sector" of statist production was operationalized using detailed SIC (standard industry classification) codes. The political superstructure includes defense, government protection services, courts, tax administration and what is generically called "public administration." The state service sector includes a variety of social and related services done within the state sector: education, health, research, communication and

postal services. In addition to those categories, the state service sector also contains employees in government industry.²⁰

There are some employment categories in the state which are ambiguous with respect to the theoretical distinction we are making. Welfare agencies, for example, often combine social control functions (part of the political superstructure) with genuine social service functions (providing services for people with disabilities, for example). For the purposes of this analysis we have classified welfare as an aspect of the service sector, since the socio-political *interests* of the people who work in such agencies seem more like those in health and education than like those in defense and the courts.

3 Statistical tests

The data analysis revolves primarily around two kinds of statistical investigations: (1) comparisons of the mean values on the dependent variables between pairs of class-by-sector categories *within* countries, and (2) comparisons *across* countries of the magnitude of these differences in class-by-sector means. The formal statistical tests for the first of these tasks consists of standard *t*-tests on differences in means between two categories. In the analysis of the differences between United States and Sweden, the formal statistical test consists of *t*-tests of differences between the class-by-sector contrasts in the two countries.

It is worth pointing out the familiar technical point that it is possible for a difference between categories to be statistically significant in country A and not statistically significant in country B, and yet for the difference of these differences to not be statistically significant (i.e. the difference in country A minus the difference in B is not significantly greater than zero by standard *t*-tests). In comparing two sets of differences each of which is in the same direction, the *t*-value of the contrast between differences will be lower than the *t*-value of the initial differences. This is because the standard error of the difference of differences (the denominator of the *t*-test) will always be larger than in

²⁰ In general, what we call the political superstructural sector corresponds to what Louis Althusser (1971) refers to as the "RSA," the repressive state apparatuses, and the service branch refers to what he called the "ISA," the ideological state apparatuses. Within Claus Offe's (1984) framework for studying the state, the state service branch consists of those social services which are *decommodified* by the intervention of the state in socio-economic activities.

the separate differences, while the numerator will always be smaller than at least one of the initial differences. It will thus usually be harder to establish a high level of statistical confidence in an observed difference between differences than in the initial within-country differences taken separately.