

21. This may not be a universal principle. Under certain circumstances, having family connections outside of the working class—such as to subsistence farmers for example—may provide workers with increased capacities for struggle, since their survival may depend less on their wage-labour jobs. In general, therefore, we might expect the following: class heterogeneity of families may reduce the interests workers might have in militant struggle but increase their capacities for struggle.

22. How homogeneous a family is obviously depends upon how narrowly or broadly one defines the lines of demarcation. If the categories are defined in extremely broad terms—all wage-earners for example—then the vast majority of families would be homogeneous; if the distinctions were drawn very finely, very few would be.

23. For details of how this extrapolation is done, see Erik Olin Wright, *Class Structure and Income Inequality*, PhD Dissertation, Berkeley 1976, pp. 162–164.

24. The household composition information was gathered in the US survey since in the US sampling procedure this was necessary in order to pick at random a respondent from the household. In Sweden this was unnecessary since the sample was drawn from a list of individuals rather than a list of telephone numbers.

Class Structure and Class Consciousness in Contemporary Capitalist Society

The problem of 'class consciousness' has frequently been at the heart of Marxist theoretical and political debates. Indeed, in the recent renaissance of Marxist scholarship, one of the central lines of cleavage has been precisely over whether consciousness is a legitimate concept at all. 'Structuralist' writers in the tradition of Louis Althusser have argued that consciousness is an epistemologically suspect category and of dubious explanatory relevance, whereas Marxists identified with the 'humanist marxist' tradition have placed consciousness at the centre of their analysis.

One of the hallmarks of these Marxist debates over consciousness is their tendency to be preoccupied with philosophical and methodological issues. The idiom of the discussion revolves around questions of whether or not human beings are the 'authors' of their own acts, whether intentions have explanatory power, whether the distinction between 'subjects' and 'objects' is an admissible one, and so on. The result is that, with relatively rare exceptions, the systematic discussion of class consciousness in the Marxist tradition has not focused on empirical problems of its explanation and consequences.

The central purpose of this chapter is to examine the empirical relation between class structure and an attitudinal measure of class consciousness. In the following section I will briefly discuss the concept of class consciousness as I will use it. This will be followed by a discussion of the causal logic of the relationship between class structure and class consciousness that will form the basis for the hypotheses we will explore empirically. In particular, I will explain why I think the micro-relationship between class structure and class consciousness can only be understood properly when it is investigated in a macro-comparative framework. The next section of the chapter will discuss briefly the problems of operationalizing

consciousness. Once all of these preliminaries are completed, we will turn to a statistical investigation of class structure and class consciousness in the United States and Sweden.

What is Class Consciousness?

There are two quite different usages of the expression 'class consciousness' in the Marxist tradition. For some theorists it is seen as a counterfactual or imputed characteristic of classes as collective entities, whereas for others it is understood as a concrete attribute of human individuals as members of classes.

The first of these usages is closely associated with the Hegelian strands of Marxist theory and is probably best represented in the work of Georg Lukács. Lukács defines class consciousness in the following manner:

Now class consciousness consists in fact of the appropriate and rational reactions "imputed" to a particular typical position in the process of production. This consciousness is, therefore, neither the sum nor the average of what is thought or felt by the single individuals who make up the class. And yet the historically significant actions of the class as a whole are determined in the last resort by this consciousness and not by the thought of the individual—and these actions can be understood only by reference to this consciousness.¹

Lukács defines class consciousness counterfactually: it is what people, as occupants of a particular location within the production process, would feel and believe if they were rational. Up to this point, the concept is very close to a Weberian ideal-typical construct, and could be regarded simply as a potentially useful heuristic device for studying class societies.² It is the next step in the argument that is most problematic and which has led to such sharp criticism of Lukács's position. Lukács argues that while class consciousness as 'imputed consciousness' does not correspond to the actual consciousness of individuals, nevertheless, this imputed consciousness is causally efficacious. In particular, the 'historically significant actions of the class as a whole are determined in the last resort by this consciousness'. What is counterfactual and imputed with respect to *individuals* is therefore treated as a *real mechanism* causally operating with respect to classes as a whole.

Such a claim, of course, could be just a short-hand way of talking about historical tendencies for the individuals involved to become

rational in the counterfactually specified manner. This imputed consciousness, therefore, could be regarded as causally efficacious for the 'action of the class as a whole' in so far as it tends to become causally efficacious for the class actions of the individuals within that class. 'Imputed consciousness' could therefore be an elliptic and rather awkward way of theorizing this emergent tendency at the individual level.

Lukács clearly rejects this interpretation. He seems to insist that this counterfactual state actually exists in some way at the supra-individual level and is causally effective even when individuals do not think in the counterfactually rational way. Class consciousness as a causally efficacious mechanism, therefore, is an attribute of classes as such, not of the individuals who make up that class. While there will in fact be tendencies for individual workers to develop individual embodiments of this generic class consciousness, what matters for understanding historical trajectories is this consciousness of the class *per se*. It is this insistence on the causal power of supra-individual consciousness that makes Lukács's work vulnerable to the critique that it is fundamentally committed to an objective teleology of history.³

The second general usage of the expression 'class consciousness' identifies it as a particular aspect of the concrete subjectivity of human individuals. When it figures in macro-social explanations it does so by virtue of the ways it helps to explain individual choices and actions. In this usage, when the term is applied to collectivities or organizations, it either refers to the patterned distribution of individual consciousness within the relevant aggregate, or it is a way of characterizing central tendencies. But such supra-individual entities, and in particular 'classes', do not have consciousness in the literal sense, since they are not the kind of entities which have minds, which think, weigh alternatives, have preferences, etc.

In practice, when Marxist historians and sociologists employ the term 'class consciousness', they frequently amalgamate these two senses of the concept. On the one hand, one often encounters expressions like 'the proletariat lacked the necessary consciousness to do X' or 'the bourgeoisie in this period was particularly class consciousness'. Such expressions seem to suggest that consciousness is attached to classes as such. On the other hand, consciousness is also treated as an explanation of individual actions and choices. In this case, the counterfactual use of the term 'class consciousness' to designate true understandings of class interests is employed strictly as a heuristic device to facilitate the assessment of the actual con-

consciousness of individuals, not as a designation of some supra-individual mechanism operating independently of individual subjectivity at the level of classes.

I will use the concept of class consciousness in this discussion strictly in the second general sense. It is at best awkward, and more frequently theoretically misleading, to employ the concept as a way of characterizing real mechanisms operating at supra-individual levels. This is not to imply, of course, that supra-individual social mechanisms are unimportant, but simply that they should not be conceptualized with the category 'consciousness'. It is also not to imply that the actual distribution of individual consciousness in a society is not of social significance and causal importance. It may well be; but a distribution of consciousness is not 'consciousness'.⁴

Understood in this way, to study 'consciousness' is to study a particular aspect of the mental life of individuals, namely, those elements of a person's subjectivity which are *discursively accessible to the individual's own awareness*. Consciousness is thus counterposed to 'unconsciousness'—the discursively inaccessible aspects of mental life. The elements of consciousness—beliefs, ideas, observations, information, theories, preferences—may not continually be in people's awareness, but they are accessible to that awareness.

This conceptualization of consciousness is closely bound up with the problem of *will* and *intentionality*. To say that something is subjectively accessible is to say that by an act of will the person can make themselves aware of it. When people make choices over alternative courses of action, the resulting action is, at least in part, to be explained by the particular conscious elements that entered into the intentions of the actor making the choice. While the problem of consciousness is not reducible to the problem of intentionality, from the point of view of social theory the most important way in which consciousness figures in social explanations is in the way it is implicated in the intentions and resulting choices of actors.

This is not to suggest, of course, that *subjectivity* only has effects through intentional choices; a wide range of psychological mechanisms may directly influence behaviour without passing through conscious intentions. Nor does the specification of consciousness in terms of intentionality and choice imply that in every social situation the most important determinants of outcomes operate through consciousness. It may well be that the crucial determinants are to be found in the processes which determine the

range of possible course of action open to actors, rather than in the actual conscious processes implicated in the choice among those alternatives. What is being claimed is that in order to understand fully the real mechanisms that link social structures to social practices, the subjective basis of the intentional choices made by the actors who live within those structures and engage in those practices must be investigated, and this implies studying consciousness.⁵

The way in which I will use the term 'consciousness' is closely linked to the problem of ideology, particularly as that concept has been elaborated in the work of Göran Therborn. Therborn defines ideology in the following way:

Ideology is the medium through which . . . consciousness and meaningfulness is formed . . . Thus the conception of ideology employed here deliberately includes both everyday notions and "experience" and elaborate intellectual doctrines, both the "consciousness" of social actors and the institutionalized thought-systems and discourses of a given society. But to study these as ideology means to look at them from a particular perspective: not as bodies of thought or structures of discourse per se, but as manifestations of a particular being-in-the-world of conscious actors, human subjects. In other words, to conceive of a text or an utterance as ideology is to focus on the way it operates in the formation and transformation of human subjectivity.⁶

I would modify Therborn's formulation in one respect only: ideology concerns the process of the formation of human *consciousness*, not the totality of human subjectivity.⁷ *Culture*, in these terms, as distinct from ideology, could be viewed as social practices, or perhaps more precisely, that dimension of social practice, which shapes the non-conscious aspects of subjectivity: character structure, personality, habits, affective styles, etc. Thus, for example, ideology produces beliefs in both the desirability of competition as a way of life and the inevitability of aggressive competitiveness as a mode of human interaction; culture, on the other hand, produces the competitive personalities capable of acting on those beliefs in an effective manner.⁸ It may well be the case that culture is considerably more important than ideology: beliefs in competitiveness may be reproducible in a society only so long as they conform to appropriate personality structures. This would correspond to the claim that the conscious dimensions of human subjectivity matter much less than the unconscious ones in explaining social practices. Nevertheless, our preoccupation in this chapter will be on consciousness and for that reason, indirectly, on ideology. This implies

that intentional action involving the conscious weighing of alternatives is an important property of social practice, and that its relationship to class is an important problem of social analysis.

Given this definition of 'consciousness', 'class' consciousness can be viewed as those aspects of consciousness with a distinctive class content to them. 'Content' can mean one of two things. First, it can refer to a logical derivation of aspects of consciousness from an analysis of class. Competitive-market relations are a distinctive structural feature of capitalism; the belief in the desirability of competition, therefore, could be viewed as having a class character to it because of its correspondence to this practice, regardless of the effects of this belief on the choices and practices of individuals. Alternatively, the class content of consciousness can refer to those aspects of consciousness which are implicated in intentions, choices and practices which have 'class pertinent effects' in the world, effects on how individuals operate within a given structure of class relations and effects on those relations themselves. This is the usage that will be emphasized in the present discussion. If class structure is understood as a terrain of social relations that determine objective material interests of actors, and class struggle is understood as the forms of social practices which attempt to realize those interests, then class consciousness can be understood as the subjective processes that shape intentional choices with respect to those interests and struggles.

A potential terminological confusion needs to be clarified at this point. It is common in Marxist discussions to distinguish workers who 'have' class consciousness from those that do not. 'Class consciousness', in these terms, constitutes a particular type of class-pertinent consciousness, namely a class-pertinent consciousness in which individuals have a relatively 'true' and 'consistent' understanding of their class interests. I am using the term class consciousness in a more general way to designate all forms of class-pertinent consciousness regardless of its faithfulness to real interests. Where I want to indicate specifically the presence of a particular type of class consciousness, therefore, it will be necessary to employ suitable adjectives: pro-working class consciousness, anti-capitalist class consciousness, revolutionary working-class consciousness, and so forth. When I use the unmodified expression 'class consciousness' it will always refer to the general domain of consciousness with a class content.

This way of understanding class consciousness suggests that the concept can be decomposed into several elements. Whenever

people make conscious choices, three dimensions of subjectivity are implicated:

1. *Perceptions of Alternatives.* To choose is to select among a set of perceived alternative courses of action. One important element of consciousness, therefore, is the subjective perception of what possibilities exist. 'Class consciousness', in these terms, involves the ways in which the perceptions of alternatives have a class content and are thus consequential for class actions.

2. *Theories of Consequences.* Perceptions of alternative possibilities are insufficient by themselves to make choices; people must also have some understanding of the expected consequences of a given choice of action. This implies that choices involve theories. These may be 'practical' theories rather than abstractly formalized theories, they may have the character of 'rules of thumb' rather than being explanatory principles. Class consciousness, in these terms, revolves around the ways in which the theories people hold shape the choices they make around class practices.

3. *Preferences.* Knowing a person's perceived alternatives and their theories of the consequences of each alternative is still not enough to explain a particular conscious choice; in addition, of course, it is necessary to know their preferences, that is, their evaluation of the desirability of those consequences. 'Desirability', in this context, can mean desirable in terms of the material benefits to the person, but there is no necessary restriction of preferences to selfish or egotistical evaluations. Class consciousness, in these terms, revolves around the subjective specification of class interests.

These three dimensions of subjectivity—perceived alternatives, theories and preferences—have been the object of classical Marxist discussions of consciousness and ideology, although generally under different names from those given here. The problem of *legitimation* revolves around the value preferences of actors. The problem of *mystification* is, above all, a problem of the theories actors hold about the causes and consequences of particular practices and social relations. And the problem of *hegemony* revolves around the way social possibilities are structured so as to restrict

the perception of the possible options to those that are compatible with dominant class interests.

The definition of class consciousness which I have proposed makes it possible to specify the sense in which consciousness can be 'false': actors may make choices under false information, with distorted perceptions of alternative possibilities and with incorrect theories of the effects of their choices. In these ways it is fairly clear what the 'falsity' of consciousness means, although it may not be so easy to establish what 'true' consciousness actually is in these cases. But what about the third element, 'preferences'? Can we say that an actor holds 'false' preferences? When Marxists talk about 'objective interests' they are, in effect, saying that there are cases when choices can be made in which the actor has correct information and correct theories, but distorted subjective understanding of their *interests*, that is of the preferences they attach to different possible courses of action.

The problem of specifying true interests (undistorted preferences) is a difficult and contentious one, and it would take us far away from the central objectives of this chapter to explore it thoroughly. A few brief comments, however, may help to clarify the position I will adopt.⁹

There are two basic senses in which we can say that a person has a distorted understanding of their true interests. The first, and simplest, is when what a person 'really wants' is blocked psychologically through some kind of mechanism. The preferences that are subjectively accessible—that are part of the individual's 'consciousness'—are therefore different from the preferences the individual would consciously hold in the absence of this block. The block in question is a real mechanism, obstructing awareness of preferences/wants that actually exist in the person's subjectivity. If we understand the operation of such psychological obstructions, then we can say something about the character of the resulting distortions.

The second way in which we can talk about distorted preferences does not imply that the undistorted preferences are actually present in the individual's subjectivity, only buried deep in the unconscious waiting to be uncovered. The second sense allows for the possibility that the distortion-mechanism operates at the level of the very formation of preferences in the first place. The obstruction, in a sense, is biographically historical; and the counterfactual is, therefore, a claim about what preferences the individual would have developed in the absence of such distortion-mechanisms dur-

ing the process of preference formation. The usual form of such an argument is to say that 'true' interests are the interests actors would hold if their subjectivities were formed under conditions of maximum possible autonomy and self-direction.

There are advantages and disadvantages with each of these approaches. The first has the advantage of being much more tractable and potentially open to empirical investigation. It is limited, however, in its ability to contend with the deepest kinds of effects cultural practices may have on the subjectivities of actors. The second alternative, however, suffers from an almost inevitable speculative quality that may have a crucial critical function but which renders the concept very problematic within scientific explanations. I will therefore adopt the first sense of distortions of interests, acknowledging the way in which it narrows the field of vision of the problems that can be addressed.

With this narrow notion of distortion as subjective obstructions to understanding interests which one actually holds, we can begin to talk about the 'true' interests attached to a person by virtue of their incumbency in a class location, and the corresponding distortions of those interests. My argument will be based on an assertion about a certain kind of preference, which I believe people in general hold even if they are not consciously aware of it, namely an interest in expanding their capacity to make choices and act upon them. This preference may be blocked, but 'deep down inside' people in general have a desire for freedom and autonomy.¹⁰ Insofar as the actual capacity that individuals have to make choices and act upon them—their real freedom—is shaped systematically by their position within the class structure, they have objective class interests based on this real interest in freedom.¹¹ To the extent that the conscious preferences of people lead them to make choices which reduce that capacity or block its expansion, then, I would say, they are acting against their 'true' or 'objective' class interests.

With this understanding of class consciousness, one can begin to develop fairly complex typologies of qualitatively distinct forms of class consciousness. These will have their basis in the ways in which perceptions, theories and preferences held by individuals advance or impede the pursuit of class interests. It is possible, for example, to distinguish between 'hegemonic', 'reformist', 'oppositional' and 'revolutionary' working class consciousness in terms of particular combinations of perceptions, theories and preferences.

This is essentially what the more sophisticated typologies of class consciousness developed in recent years have tried to do.¹²

In the present study I will not attempt to elaborate a nuanced typology of forms of class consciousness. The data that we will employ could be stretched to operationalize such typologies, but my general feeling is that the limitations of survey research methodology make it preferable to adopt relatively simple and transparent variables. Certainly in the initial explorations of the problem, it will be desirable to adopt a fairly straightforward approach. The measures of class consciousness which we will use, therefore, are designed to discover, in a general way, the extent to which individuals have attitudes that are consistent with working class or capitalist class interests.

Causal Logic

If class consciousness is understood in terms of the class content of perceptions, theories and preferences that shape intentional choices, then the explanatory problem in the analysis of class consciousness is to elaborate the processes by which such class content is determined and the effects it has on the patterns of class formation and class conflict. The classical Marxist theory of commodity fetishism is precisely such a theory: it is an account of how the perceptions and theories of actors are imbued with a particular class content by virtue of the operation of commodity relations. The immediate lived experience of producers in a commodity-producing society, the story goes, represents the social relations between people as relations between things (commodities), and this in turn generates the mental structures characterized as 'fetishized consciousness'. Such consciousness in turn, it is argued, plays an important role in conveying a sense of the permanence and naturalness of capitalism, thus impeding revolutionary projects for the transformation of capitalist society.

The causal model of consciousness formation which underlies the empirical investigations in this chapter is deliberately simple. Its purpose is to try to capture the most pervasive and systematic determinations at work, rather than to map the full range of complexities that may enter into the consciousness formation process of individuals. The model is based on two general premisses:

Premiss 1. The material interests rooted in exploitation relations and thus linked to the class structure are real; they exist indepen-

dently of the concrete subjectivities and personal characteristics of the incumbents of class locations. If this premiss is accepted, then two general expectations follow: first, given certain minimum assumptions about human rationality, all things being equal there will be at least a weak tendency for individuals to develop forms of consciousness consistent with their objective class interests. 'Tendency', of course, does not imply that all incumbents of a given location in the class structure will have the same consciousness, but simply that the probability of them having forms of consciousness consistent with the objective interests attached to that class location is higher than for incumbents of other class locations. The perceptions of those interests may be partial and incomplete, but the tendency will be for such distorted perceptions of interests to take the form of deviations from a full understanding of interests rather than completely imaginary ones. Second, while the personal attributes of individuals may affect the strength of the association between class structure and class consciousness, the linkage between class and consciousness will not be an artifact of personal attributes of incumbents; it is based in the objective properties of the class structure itself.

On the basis of these expectations, we can formulate two empirically 'testable' hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. The class content of consciousness will vary monotonically with class location along the dimensions of the class-exploitation matrix in table 6.1.

Hypothesis 2. The relationship between location in the class structure and the class content of consciousness will not disappear when various personal attributes of incumbents in class locations (social origins, age, sex, etc.) are controlled for statistically.

Premiss 2. While consciousness-formation is a process that occurs within individuals, the process itself is heavily conditioned by social structural and historical factors. The class experiences that shape consciousness are always organized socially; they are never simply the result of an unmediated encounter of an atomized individual with an 'event'. This can be viewed both as an epistemological and a sociological claim. Epistemologically, it is equivalent to a rejection of pure empiricism where knowledge is generated from the accumulation of pure sense-data. 'Facts' are never neutrally perceived; there is always some cognitive mediation through already existing mental (theoretical) categories. Sociologically,

this is an argument about the social construction of the ideological categories in terms of which people interpret their world. For example, whether a person experiences unemployment as personal failure or as social injustice depends upon such things as the strategies of political parties and trade unions, the policies of the state, the curriculum in schools, and so forth. The event itself does not dictate a unique subjective experience, and thus does not generate a unique pattern of consciousness-formation.

This social mediation of the consciousness-formation process suggests the following empirical hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. Where political parties and trade unions adopt strategies that emphasize class-interpretations of the world, the pattern of class consciousness variations hypothesized in Hypothesis 1 will be more polarized and more systematic.

This hypothesis can be schematically represented in the simple interactive causal model illustrated in Figure 7.1. This will be the core model for the comparative empirical investigation of class structure and class consciousness in Sweden and the United States.




FIGURE 7.1
Model of class structure and class location

Operationalizations

Class Consciousness

Class consciousness, as we noted in chapter five, is notoriously hard to measure. The concept is meant to denote subjective properties which impinge on conscious choosing activity with a class content. The question then arises whether or not the subjective states which the concept taps are really only 'activated' under

conditions of meaningful choice situations. In the case of class consciousness this would above all imply that they would be activated in situations of class struggle. There is no necessary reason to assume that these subjective states will be the same when respondents are engaged in other kinds of conscious choosing (such as occurs in an interview). The interview setting is itself, after all, a social relation, and this may influence the responses of respondents, either out of deference, or hostility or through some other reaction. Furthermore, it is always possible that there is not simply a slippage between the way people respond to the artificial choices in a survey and the real choices of social practices, but that there is a systematic inversion of responses. As a result, it has been argued that there is little value in even attempting to measure class consciousness through survey instruments.¹³

These problems are serious ones, and potentially undermine the value of questionnaire studies of class consciousness. My assumption, however, is that the cognitive processes of people have some stability across the artificial setting of an interview and the real life setting of class struggle, and that in spite of the possible distortions of structured interviews, social surveys can potentially measure these stable elements. While the ability of a survey to predict for any given individual the way they would behave in a 'real life setting' may be very limited, surveys may be able to provide a broad image of how class structure is linked to likely class behaviours.

The survey used in this research contains a wide variety of attitude items, ranging from questions dealing directly with political issues, to normative issues on equal opportunity for women, to explanations for various kinds of social problems. Many of these items can be interpreted as indicators of class consciousness, but for most of them the specific class-content of the items is indirect and presupposes fairly strong theoretical assumptions.¹⁴ For the purposes of this initial investigation, therefore, it seemed advisable to focus on those items with the most direct class implications, and to aggregate these questions into a fairly simple, transparent class consciousness scale.

The measure of class consciousness we will adopt is basically the same as the attitude scale used in the adjudication of contending definitions of the working class in chapter five. The only difference is that two of the items used in the construction of that scale were not asked on the Swedish survey, and therefore the scale is based on only six, rather than eight, survey questions (and thus has a

range of values from -6 to +6). The excluded questions from those used in chapter five are:

3. Striking workers are generally justified in physically preventing strikebreakers from entering the place of work.
5. One of the main reasons for poverty is that the economy is based on private property and profits.

The first of these was left off the Swedish survey because the forming of picket-lines and physically preventing scabs from entering a workplace is largely absent from contemporary working class practices in Sweden. Since the practice was absent from the strategic repertoire of Swedish workers, it was difficult to convey meaningfully the degree of coercion embedded in the word 'physically' in this statement. The question on causes of poverty was excluded because it was felt that since poverty was not generally considered a salient social problem in Sweden, the question would make little sense.

In addition to this constructed consciousness scale, we will also examine the relationship between class structure and the conventional variable measuring class identification discussed in chapter five. In terms of the earlier theoretical discussion of class consciousness, 'class identification' in a sense combines all three dimensions of consciousness—the perceptual, theoretical and normative. To identify with a particular class is to perceive the world in certain categories, probably to hold some theories about the causes and consequences of class membership, and to hold at least some evaluative sense of interests tied to that class. It is because class identification seems to link these various aspects in such a compact way that it has generally been the favourite variable of sociologists engaged in the empirical investigation of class attitudes.

Working Class Trajectory

This is a constructed variable combining information on the respondent's class origins and prior job history.¹⁵ The highest value of 6 is assigned to people with working-class origins who have never been self-employed or held a supervisory job; the lowest value of 1 is given to people who come from a non-working-class background and have been self-employed. It should be noted that respondents who are currently self-employed *cannot* have the

highest value on this variable since they have had the experience of self-employment.¹⁶

Working Class Networks

This variable combines information about the class character of the individual's social networks, present family, and secondary jobs. The highest value of 9 is for people whose three best friends are all working class, whose spouse (if they are married) is working class and who do not have a non-working-class second job. The lowest value of 1 is for people whose three best friends are all non-workers, whose spouse is a non-worker and whose second job (if they have one) is non-working class.

A Note on Statistical Procedures

INTERPRETING REGRESSION EQUATIONS

A good deal of the data analysis which will be presented in this chapter revolves around the use of multiple regression analysis. For readers unfamiliar with statistics, a brief word about how to interpret such equations might be helpful.

A regression equation basically answers the following kind of question: if we were to compare two people who differed by, say, one unit of education, by how much would we expect their income (or some other outcome) to differ? The amount of that income difference is the 'raw coefficient' (also called the 'B' coefficient) for the education variable in a regression equation in which education is used to predict income.

There are basically two sorts of regression equations that are typically employed in data analysis. First there are 'simple regressions' in which one 'independent variable' is used to predict a dependent variable. In the example above this was education being used to predict income. Second, there are 'multiple regression equations' or 'multi-variate regressions'. Let us suppose that we wanted to ask a more complex question than the one posed above: if we were to compare two people who differed by one unit of education but who had the same age, sex, and social origin, by how much would we expect their income to differ? In this multi-variate equation, education, sex, age and origin are all treated as independent variables which simultaneously predict income. The

coefficients for each of these variables tell us how much we expect people to differ on the 'dependent variable' (income in this case) for one unit difference in the independent variable, controlling for the other independent variables in the equation.

A regression equation always contains a set of coefficients for each of the independent variables and a 'constant' term. The constant term tells you what value on the dependent variable one would expect to observe if the values on the predictor variables were all equal to zero.

If the mean value on each of the independent variables are multiplied by the raw coefficients for that variable, and all of these products are added together with the constant term, the resulting figure is always exactly the mean value on the dependent variable.

In the equations we will be examining, there are two sorts of variables that will be used as 'independent' variables or predictors. One kind of variable has a continuous metric of some sort. Age and income are examples. A second sort of variable is a dichotomy. Sex is an example. In regression equations, dichotomies are generally referred to as 'dummy variables', variables which can have a value of either 0 or 1. The coefficient of a dummy variable for sex would tell us, for example, how much the average income of men and women differ (controlling for whatever other variables are in the equation); the mean value for a dummy variable is simply the proportion of the respondents in category 1 of the dichotomy.

Dummy variables will be particularly important in our analysis because the class typology is basically a typology of qualitatively distinct positions. Such a typology is represented in a regression equation by a series of dummy variables. If there are twelve categories in the typology, then eleven dummy variables are needed to fully represent the cells in the typology.¹⁷

The coefficients of variables in regressions are generally presented in two forms. The first is the 'raw' coefficient. This tells you how much the dependent variable is expected to change for a unit change in the predictor variable, where those 'units' are the natural metrics of the variables: dollars, years of education, values on an attitude scale, etc. The second is what is called a 'standardized' coefficient, or a ' β ' coefficient. In many instances the raw units of the variables in question are not particularly meaningful or interesting. For example, if we want to know whether education or age makes more of a difference for income, it is not very interest-

ing to know whether a year of education matters more than a year of age. What we would like to do is convert these two variables into some kind of 'standardized' scale which would make them comparable. This is what the standardized coefficients accomplish. Essentially, they convert all of the variables in the equation into standard-deviation units, units that are defined relative to the actual distributions of each variable. This makes it possible to compare coefficients within an equation in a reasonable manner.

There are two properties of any coefficients that are of statistical interest. One is the magnitude of the coefficient (in either raw form or standardized form); the other is its significance level. The significance level tells us how confident we are that the coefficient is really different from zero. (There is no necessary reason why zero should be the standard for evaluating significance levels, but in most situations there is no other value that has any strong theoretical status). A significance level of .001 means that on the basis of certain statistical assumptions, it would be expected that in only one out of a thousand samples would we expect a coefficient of this size if the coefficient were really indistinguishable from zero. As in the statistical tests of differences in means in the adjudication analysis in chapter five, it is important not to become preoccupied with significance levels. A variable which has a higher level of statistical significance is not thereby a more 'important' causal factor; it just means that we have more confidence that it has whatever importance it has.

One final statistical element of a regression equation is termed the 'explained variance' in the equation, usually designated R^2 . This number in effect tells you what proportion of the variability in the dependent variable is accounted for by all of the independent variables in the equation. An R^2 of .25 indicates that one quarter of the variance has been accounted for by the variables in the equation, three-quarters has not. The unexplained variance is a combination of variance that could potentially be accounted for if additional variables were included in the equation, and variance which is essentially due to random factors (measurement error, strictly idiosyncratic determinants of the dependent variable, etc.). There is no way of knowing, of course, what part of the unexplained variance is 'explainable' statistically—i.e. what part is genuinely random and what part is systematic—and this makes it difficult to know whether a given R^2 is high or low, reflecting a success or a failure in an equation. For this reason, in general, all that really matters (with respect to the assess-

ment of R^2) is its relative magnitude compared to rival equations. In general in regression equations predicting attitude scales, an R^2 of even .15 is quite respectable.

ANALYSING ADJUSTED MEANS

In part of the analysis which follows we will be analysing the adjusted means for the class-consciousness scale for specific classes (see tables 7.4 and 7.6). Since this is not a conventional way of displaying regression results, some commentary is necessary.

Our hypotheses are framed in terms of expected differences in ideology across the various dimensions of the class structure matrix. These expectations are most effectively displayed in the form of expected values in the cells of the table. For the direct relationship between class structure and consciousness—hypothesis 1—this is simply the mean for the consciousness scale for each cell in the typology.

In order to examine the effects of personal attributes on the relationship between class structure and class consciousness—hypothesis 2—we need to calculate 'adjusted means' for this typology. That is, we need to calculate the expected values in the cells controlling for whatever variables are being included as personal attributes which might affect the process of consciousness formation. If indeed all of the differences between cells in the simple analysis were results of these attributes, then these adjusted means would all be the same.

These adjusted means are calculated as follows: a regression equation is calculated containing all of the class typology dummy variables (eleven in all) together with whatever variables are being treated as personal attributes. The *relative* differences in these adjusted means are directly given by the unstandardized (raw) coefficients of the class dummy variables in this multiple regression equation. How are the *absolute* values calculated? It will be recalled from the discussion of interpreting regression equations that if we multiply the coefficient of each independent variable by the mean value for that independent variable and then add them together with the constant term we get the overall sample mean for the dependent variable. To calculate the adjusted means for the *cells* in the table (rather than the overall sample mean) we multiply each of the coefficients of the *control* variables (personal attributes in this case) by their mean values and add these products together with the constant term. This sum constitutes an adjustment which

is then added to the coefficients of each of the class-typology dummy variables, giving the adjusted means for the typology. The entries in the tables using such adjusted means should be interpreted as the expected value on the consciousness scale for people in the cell, controlling for the relevant independent variables, evaluated at the socially average levels of sex, age, and so on, within that country.

Empirical Results

The data analysis will involve three steps:

(1) *Examining the direct relationship between class structure and class consciousness in the United States and Sweden.* This will be done by comparing the mean values on the consciousness scale for the various cells in the class typology for the United States and Sweden. Particular attention will be paid to the differences in the overall pattern of these means in the two countries.

(2) *Examining the extent to which the patterns observed in the analysis of the direct relationship between class structure and class consciousness are significantly modified when various control variables are added.* This will enable us to examine three inter-related issues: (a) whether or not the observed relation between class location and class consciousness could be a spurious effect of certain personal attributes of the incumbents of these positions; (b) the extent to which the effects of class structure on class consciousness operate largely through certain 'intervening variables' such as union membership, income, unemployment history, etc., or are direct consequences of class location as such; and (c) whether the different overall patterns between the United States and Sweden are largely the result of the link between class and these intervening variables or are directly tied to the way class structure influences consciousness.

(3) *Examining the differences between the United States and Sweden in the overall structure of the consciousness-formation process.* The above analyses are mainly concerned with the effects of class structure as such on consciousness in the two countries. In this final part of the investigation we will examine the differences between the two countries in the effects of various other variables on

consciousness. The methodological assumption will be that the pattern of coefficients in a multiple regression equation predicting consciousness can be viewed as tapping a particular society's macro-structural process of consciousness formation. Comparing the patterning of such coefficients across countries, therefore, gives us an empirical handle on the differences in that process.

1. DIRECT RELATIONSHIP OF CLASS STRUCTURE TO CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Table 7.1 presents the mean values on the class consciousness scale by class location in the United States and Sweden. Table 7.2 presents the proportion of respondents in each class who say that they are in the working class on the class identification question and who take the pro-working class position on each of the indi-

TABLE 7.1
Class consciousness by location in the class structure

I. United States

Assets in the means of production

Owners	Non-owners [wage labourers]			
1 Bourgeoisie -1.31 ^a	4 Expert managers -1.46	7 Semi-cred. managers -0.34	10 Uncred. managers -0.29	+
2 Small employers -0.87	5 Expert supervisors -0.78	8 Semi-cred. supervisors -0.24	11 Uncred. supervisors +0.54	>0 Organization assets
3 Petty bourgeoisie -0.09	6 Expert non-managers -0.09	9 Semi-cred. workers +0.78	12 Proletarians +0.78	-
	+	>0	-	Skill/credential assets

vidual items that go into the class attitude scale.¹⁸ Several generalizations can be drawn from these results:

(1) *The Overall Pattern of Variations.* In table 7.1 the overall pattern of variations in means (not the absolute value of the means, but the patterning of the means) is quite similar in the United States and Sweden. In both countries the table is basically polarized between the capitalist class and the working class (in neither country is there a statistically significant difference between proletarians and the marginal categories adjacent to the working class).¹⁹ In both countries the values on the scale become decreasingly pro-working class and eventually pro-capitalist class as one moves from the proletarian corner of the table to the expert-manager corner of the table. As in the analysis of income varia-

TABLE 7.1 (continued)

II. Sweden

Assets in the means of production

Owners	Non-owners [wage labourers]			
1 Bourgeoisie -2.00	4 Expert managers -0.70	7 Semi-cred. managers +1.03	10 Uncred. managers +1.81	+
2 Small employers -0.98	5 Expert supervisors +0.07	8 Semi-cred. supervisors +0.74	11 Uncred. supervisors +1.98	>0 Organization assets
3 Petty bourgeoisie +0.46	6 Expert non-manager +1.29	9 Semi-cred. workers +2.81	12 Proletarian +2.60	-
	+	>0	-	Skill/credential assets

^aEntries in the table are means on the working class consciousness scale. The values on the scale range from +6 (pro-working class on every item) to -6 (pro-capitalist class on every item).

TABLE 7.2
Working Class identification and responses to individual items by
class location

I. United States		%who take the working class position on:					
Class location	Working class I.D.	Individual items in consciousness scale ^a					
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1. Proletarians (12) ^b	32	56	27	49	55	75	19
2. Semi-credentialed workers (9)	28	61	28	48	58	82	14
3. Uncredentialed supervisors (11)	31	56	24	56	44	87	16
4. Expert employees (6)	15	58	26	36	36	80	13
5. Semi-credentialed supervisors (8)	32	50	27	35	42	77	11
6. Uncredentialed managers (10)	28	55	15	28	46	76	13
7. Expert supervisors (5)	9	57	22	26	34	69	5
8. Semi-credentialed managers (7)	16	52	19	33	45	80	7
9. Expert managers (4)	8	33	24	27	22	60	9
10. Petty bourgeoisie (3)	31	49	35	30	43	79	7
11. Small employers (2)	29	50	17	31	24	66	8
12. Bourgeoisie (1)	9	28	27	23	25	65	0
II. Sweden							
1. Proletarians (12)	57	70	48	51	81	81	58
2. Semi-credentialed workers (9)	51	72	52	59	82	82	63
3. Uncredentialed supervisors (11)	61	59	52	55	81	77	39
4. Expert employees (6)	21	62	39	44	71	64	32
5. Semi-credentialed supervisors (8)	40	57	27	35	78	68	30
6. Uncredentialed managers (10)	39	64	40	46	82	82	47
7. Expert supervisors (5)	19	36	26	19	84	67	20
8. Semi-credentialed managers (7)	36	68	47	35	77	66	30
9. Expert managers (4)	14	37	35	22	65	47	14
10. Petty bourgeoisie (3)	43	38	31	40	65	60	22
11. Small employers (2)	31	31	20	34	50	54	15
12. Bourgeoisie (1)	25	13	13	25	25	50	13

tions by class in chapter six, the means on the attitude scale change in a largely monotonic manner along every dimension of the table. And in both countries, the means become increasingly pro-capitalist as you move from the petty bourgeoisie to the capitalist class proper among the self-employed.

A basically similar pattern of results occurs for the working class identification responses in table 7.2. In Sweden, 57 per cent of proletarians and between 50 and 60 per cent of the respondents in the marginal locations close to the working class say that they are in the working class, compared to 39 per cent of uncredentialed managers, 21 per cent of non-managerial experts, 14 per cent of expert managers and 25 per cent of capitalists. In the United States around 30 per cent of the respondents in the working class and marginal working-class locations identify with the working class. This figure does not decline significantly for uncredentialed managers (28 per cent), but drops to 15 per cent for non-managerial experts and less than 10 per cent for expert managers and capitalists. These various results are thus quite supportive of hypothesis 1.

(2) *The Degree of Polarization.* The degree of polarization in the two countries is very different. In the United States the difference between the capitalist class and the working class is just over 2 points on the scale; in Sweden the difference is 4.6 points. (The difference between these differences is statistically significant at the .05 level).

The difference in degrees of polarization is particularly dramatic in the questionnaire item concerning the outcome of strikes (item

^aThe items are as follows:

- (1) Corporations benefit owners at the expense of workers and consumers;
- (2) It is possible for a modern society to run effectively without the profit motive;
- (3) If given the chance, the non-management employees at the place where you work could run things effectively without bosses;
- (4) During a strike, management should be prohibited by law from hiring workers to take the place of strikers;
- (5) Big corporations have far too much power in American [Swedish] society today;
- (6) Imagine that workers in a major industry are out on strike over working conditions and wages. Which of the following outcomes would you like to see occur: (a) the workers win their most important demands; (b) the workers win some of their demands and make major concessions; (c) the workers win only a few of their demands and make major concessions; (d) the workers go back to work without winning any of their demands. (% who give response a).

^bThe numbers in parentheses correspond to the cells in Table 7.1.

6 in table 7.2). In the United States, while more workers than expert managers and capitalists take the pro-working class position, the overwhelming majority of respondents in every class location opt for the class compromise response, namely that in a strike the workers should win some of their demands and make some concessions. In Sweden, on the other hand, about 60 per cent of proletarians and semi-credentialed employees (i.e. mainly skilled workers) say that they feel the workers should win most of their demands, compared to less than 15 per cent of the expert managers and capitalists. While the class hegemony of the bourgeoisie in the United States has not been able to obliterate tendencies towards ideological polarization in the American class structure, that polarization is very muted compared to Sweden, at least as measured by these class-pertinent attitudes.

These data indicate that there is basically an international consensus within the capitalist class on class-based attitudes, whereas no such consensus exists in the working class: Swedish and American workers on average differ on this scale by nearly as much as American workers and capitalists. These results are consistent with hypothesis 3, that the degree of polarization will depend in part on the extent to which political parties and unions adopt strategies which help to crystallize workers' experiences in class terms.

(3) *Class Alliances*. The patterns of class alliances—the ways in which the terrain of class structure becomes transformed into class formations—suggested by the patterns of consciousness in table 7.1 varies considerably in the two countries. In Sweden the only wage-earner category with an average pro-capitalist position is expert managers; in the United States, pro-capitalist positions penetrate much further into the wage-earner population. In the United States, only the three cells in the lower right hand corner of the table can be considered part of a working class coalition; in Sweden the coalition extends to all uncredentialed wage-earners and all non-management wage earners, and, at least in a weak sense, includes semi-credentialed managers and semi-credentialed supervisors as well. Turning these results into proportions of the labour force based on the distributions in table 6.1, in the United States approximately 30 per cent of the labour force are in class locations that can be considered part of a bourgeois coalition, compared to only about 10 per cent in Sweden. On the other hand, in Sweden between 70 and 80 per cent of

the labour force are in class locations that are ideologically part of a working class coalition, compared to only about 58 per cent in the United States.²⁰ To say this, of course, is *not* equivalent to saying that 58 per cent of the individuals in the labour force in the United States and 70–80 per cent in Sweden are in the working class coalition, since there are individual workers who are ideologically part of the bourgeois coalition and individual managers (and even capitalists) who are ideologically part of the working class coalition. But it does mean that the working class coalition in the United States is not only less polarized ideologically from the bourgeoisie than in Sweden, but also that it has a much smaller class base.

2. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTED MEANS

Two kinds of questions can be raised about the results in tables 7.1 and 7.2. First, it is important to know whether or not the results can be reinterpreted as consequences of various attributes of the incumbents of class locations that are not themselves direct consequences of class as such. For example, different classes have different mixes of sexes and ages, and it could be that the consciousness maps in these tables are really age and gender maps, only incidentally linked to class structure. Second, it is important to know the extent to which these results are *direct* consequences of incumbency in class locations *per se* or whether they operate through intervening mechanisms. Class locations, for example, determine (in part) income and union membership, and it is possible that the gross class structure–class consciousness relationship mapped out in tables 7.1 and 7.2 is generated largely through such intervening mechanisms. The second of these problems does not challenge the hypothesis that class structure shapes class consciousness, but simply indicates some of the mechanisms through which these effects are generated. The first problem, however, calls into question the claim that class structure as such is a central determinant.

(1) *Is the relationship between class structure and class consciousness spurious?* Table 7.3 presents the results observed in table 7.1 separately for men and women in Sweden and the United States. Table 7.4 presents the results for the adjusted mean values on the working class consciousness scale of different locations in the class structure typology, controlling for three personal attri-

butes that potentially might call into question the results in table 7.1—age, sex and class biography.²¹

Table 7.3 indicates that for both the United States and Sweden the basic patterns observed in table 7.1 can be observed among men and women taken separately. This is especially the case for men, where the pattern of polarization and monotonicity holds very strongly in both countries.

There are, nevertheless, some differences between men and women that are worth noting. In general the degree of class polarization among men is considerably greater than among women. Male proletarians and expert managers differ by 2.8 points in the United States and 3.6 points in Sweden, whereas their women

TABLE 7.3
Class attitudes by class locations within sex categories, United States and Sweden

I. United States

Assets in the means of production

Owners

Non-owners [wage labourers]

1 Bourgeoisie	4 Expert managers	7 Semi-cred. managers	10 Uncred. managers	+ Organ- ization assets
M -1.45 (22) ^a W -0.75 (6)	M -1.84 (43) W -0.32 (14)	M -0.33 (71) W -0.29 (21)	M +0.55 (11) W -0.65 (24)	
2 Small employers	5 Expert supervisors	8 Semi-cred. supervisors	11 Uncred. supervisors	
M -1.18 (60) W -0.27 (30)	M -1.02 (39) W -0.21 (16)	M -0.21 (76) W -0.32 (25)	M +0.77 (42) W +0.38 (60)	>0
3 Petty bourgeoisie	6 Expert non-manager	9 Semi-cred. workers	12 Proletarian	-
M -0.18 (51) W +0.01 (51)	M -0.83 (24) W +0.58 (27)	M +0.81 (134) W +0.70 (48)	M +0.97 (234) W +0.66 (359)	-
+ >0 -				
Skill/credential assets				

Men (M): N = 807
Women (W): N = 680

TABLE 7.3 (continued)

II. Sweden

Assets in the means of production

Owners

Non-owners [wage labourers]

1 Bourgeoisie	4 Expert managers	7 Semi-cred. managers	10 Uncred. managers	+ Organ- ization assets
M -2.00 (8) W +0.20 (0)	M -0.89 (45) W +0.62 (7)	M +1.05 (40) W +0.92 (8)	M +1.40 (15) W +2.23 (14)	
2 Small employers	5 Expert supervisors	8 Semi-cred. supervisors	11 Uncred. supervisors	
M -1.24 (46) W +0.10 (11)	M -0.95 (19) W +0.83 (25)	M +0.62 (29) W +1.13 (9)	M +2.21 (28) W +1.25 (9)	>0
3 Petty bourgeoisie	6 Expert non-manager	9 Semi-cred. workers	12 Proletarian	-
M +0.38 (48) W +0.71 (15)	M +1.24 (45) W +1.34 (35)	M +3.24 (133) W +2.08 (77)	M +2.70 (204) W +2.53 (309)	-
+ >0 -				
Skill/credential assets				

Men (M): N = 660
Women (W): N = 519

^aNumbers in parentheses are weighted Ns.

counterparts differ by only 1 point in the United States and 1.9 points in Sweden. Most of this lower degree of polarization comes from the fact that women expert managers are considerably less pro-capitalist than men expert managers, probably reflecting their concentration in lower levels of management.

In one other respect the table differs between men and women: the uncredentialed manager cell does not 'behave' properly for women: in Sweden this cell is nearly as pro-working class as the proletarian cell and certainly does not follow the prescribed monotonic pattern; among American women, on the other hand, it is the least pro-working class of all the wage-earner categories. I cannot offer any explanations for these specific results. In any event, it is

certainly not the case that the overall class structure patterns in table 7.1 are artifacts of the sex compositions of classes.

When we expand the possible sources of spuriousness to include age and class trajectory and calculate the adjusted means in table 7.4 we again see that there is no evidence that the observed relations in table 7.1 are artifacts of the personal attributes of the incumbents in class locations. While classes certainly do vary considerably on these variables, they are not the source of variations across classes in class consciousness.

(2) *Intervening mechanisms in the consciousness formation process.* Table 7.5 examines the patterns in table 7.1 separately for union members and non-union members in each country. Table 7.6 then examines the adjusted means, adding to the con-

TABLE 7.4
Adjusted mean class consciousness by class location controlling for personal attributes

I. United States

Assets in the means of production

Owners

Non-owners [wage labourers]

1 Bourgeoisie	4 Expert managers	7 Semi-cred. managers	10 Uncred. managers	+ Organization assets
-1.11 ^a	-1.45	-0.36	-0.29	
2 Small employers	5 Expert supervisors	8 Semi-cred. supervisors	11 Uncred. supervisors	
-0.80	-0.81	-0.28	+0.50	- Skill/credential assets
3 Petty bourgeoisie	6 Expert non-manager	9 Semi-cred. workers	12 Proletarians	
+0.05	-0.20	+0.70	+0.80	
	+	>0	-	

TABLE 7.4 (continued)

II. Sweden

Assets in the means of production

Owners

Non-owners [wage labourers]

1 Bourgeoisie	4 Expert managers	7 Semi-cred. managers	10 Uncred. managers	+ Organization assets
-1.46	-0.58	+1.15	+1.90	
2 Small employers	5 Expert supervisors	8 Semi-cred. supervisors	11 Uncred. supervisors	
-0.39	+0.24	+0.78	+2.05	- Skill/credential assets
3 Petty bourgeoisie	6 Expert non-manager	9 Semi-cred. workers	12 Proletarians	
+1.05	+1.23	+2.69	+2.40	
	+	>0	-	

Entries in cells are adjusted mean values on the working class consciousness scale, calculated from a multiple regression equation containing the class dummy variables, age, sex and class trajectory. See Table 7.7 equation (2).

trols in table 7.4 a number of intervening variables: personal income, unearned income, home ownership, unemployment experience, working-class networks and union membership.²²

Union membership is likely to be among the most important intervening factors in the consciousness formation process. It is certainly closely tied to class location, particularly in the United States where the legal system prohibits certain class locations among wage-earners from becoming unionized—management positions are generally not allowed to be in unions—and one would expect that unions ought to have at least some impact on class attitudes. In these terms, the results in table 7.5 are quite interesting. First of all, they clearly indicate the mediating role of

unionize significant segments of management and as a result has driven a wedge into this class location, generating a fairly sharp line of demarcation between upper level managers and the bulk of managerial employees. Most of this change in the adjusted means of the expert-manager cell can be attributed to the operation of the union variable. As table 7.4 indicates, the overall pro-capitalist stance of expert managers in Sweden comes from the very pro-capitalist position—more pro-capitalist in fact than their American counterparts—of non-unionized expert managers in Sweden. This division between unionized and non-unionized expert managers undoubtedly corresponds to a division between top management and other managers. What we are observing here is that the union movement is able to pull lower and middle levels of management into at least a passive coalition with workers. In part because

TABLE 7.6
Adjusted mean class consciousness by class location controlling for mediating variables

I. United States

Assets in the means of production

Owners	Non-owners [wage labourers]			
1 Bourgeoisie -0.20 ^a	4 Expert managers -0.87	7 Semi-cred. managers -0.08	10 Uncred. managers -0.33	+
2 Small employers -0.50	5 Expert supervisors -0.30	8 Semi-cred. supervisors -0.20	11 Uncred. supervisors +0.42	>0
3 Petty bourgeoisie -0.01	6 Expert non-managers +0.07	9 Semi-cred. workers +0.55	12 Proletarians +0.53	-
	+	>0	-	
	Skill/credential assets			

Organization assets

TABLE 7.6 (continued)

II. Sweden

Assets in the means of production

Owners	Non-owners [wage labourers]			
1 Bourgeoisie -0.85	4 Expert managers +0.53	7 Semi-cred. managers +1.34	10 Uncred. managers +1.85	+
2 Small employers -0.04	5 Expert supervisors +0.41	8 Semi-cred. supervisors +0.60	11 Uncred. supervisors +2.03	>0
3 Petty bourgeoisie +0.61	6 Expert non-managers +1.32	9 Semi-cred. workers +2.40	12 Proletarians +2.04	-
	+	>0	-	
	Skill/credential assets			

Organization assets

^aEntries in cells are adjusted mean values on the working class consciousness scale, calculated from a multiple regression equation containing the class dummy variables, age, sex, working class trajectory, working class networks, ever unemployed dummy, personal income, unearned income dummy, home ownership dummy, and union member dummy. See Table 7.7, equation (3).

of legal obstacles to unionizing managers, and in part because of the general weakness of the American labour movement, this has not happened in the United States, and as a result the rank-and-file of management is firmly integrated with the bourgeoisie ideologically.

A second point of contrast between table 7.1 and table 7.6, is that the difference in the degree of polarization among wage earners between the United States and Sweden is no long as striking as in the original table. In table 7.1 expert managers and proletarians differed by 3.3 points in Sweden and by 2.24 in the United States; in table 7.6 the respective differences are 1.51 and 1.40 (not statistically significant). Most of this reduction in the

difference between countries in degrees of polarization between classes can be attributed to the inclusion of unionization as an intervening variable. This supports the interpretation suggested in hypothesis 2 that the degree of polarization is mediated by organizational and political factors.

A third, and related point, is that the difference between non-unionized workers in Sweden and in the United States is somewhat less than between unionized workers. This suggests that it is not simply the fact of unionization that acts as a mediating process in consciousness-formation, but the strength and social weight of the labour movement.

Finally, in one important respect, the patterns in table 7.6 differ from those in table 7.1: for the United States, the bourgeoisie itself is now less pro-capitalist than nearly any of the wage-earner categories that are pro-capitalist. My expectation had been that the ideological stance of capitalists would be more directly tied to their class position than would be the case for wage-earners, and thus their adjusted means would be less affected by the inclusion of intervening variables in the equation. This is indeed the case in Sweden, but not in the United States. I do not have an explanation for this result. The intervening variables which most affected the regression coefficients for the bourgeoisie dummy variable were the income variables, particularly the 'unearned income' dummy variable. Since this variable is so closely tied to their class location, it may be inappropriate to consider it an intervening variable at all in their case.²⁴

3. ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL CONSCIOUSNESS DETERMINATION PROCESS

So far we have looked exclusively at the relationship between class structure and consciousness. In this final analysis we will examine the relationship between the other independent variables used to generate tables 7.4 and 7.6 and consciousness. The results are presented in table 7.7.

There are a number of striking properties of these equations. First, class and class biography variables (working-class trajectory, unemployment experience and working-class networks) consistently have bigger effects in Sweden than in the United States. The class dummy variables alone explain 13 per cent of the variance in the Swedish equation but only 6 per cent in the US equation. When the various class experience variables are added

TABLE 7.7
Class structure, class biography and class consciousness in Sweden and the United States:
multiple regression analysis

Dependent variable = working class consciousness scale		
	Equation (1)	
Independent variables	United States B (β)	Sweden B (β)
<i>Class dummy variables</i>		
(Proletariat: left out category)		
1. Bourgeoisie	-2.09 (-0.11)***	-4.54 (-0.12)***
2. Small employer	-1.66 (-0.15)***	-3.52 (-0.23)***
3. Petty bourgeoisie	-0.87 (-0.08)**	-2.08 (-0.15)***
4. Expert manager	-2.25 (-0.17)***	-3.23 (-0.21)***
5. Expert supervisor	-1.56 (-0.11)***	-2.47 (-0.15)***
6. Expert non-manager	-0.88 (-0.06)*	-1.25 (-0.10)***
7. Semi-credentialed manager	-1.10 (-0.10)***	-1.51 (-0.09)***
8. Semi-credentialed supervisor	-1.02 (-0.10)***	-1.80 (-0.10)***
9. Semi-credentialed worker	-0.00 (-0.00)	0.27 (0.03)
10. Uncredentialed manager	-1.08 (-0.06)*	-0.73 (-0.04)
11. Uncredentialed supervisor	-0.24 (-0.02)	-0.56 (-0.03)
Constant	0.79	2.54
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.13
N	1491	1191
	Equation (2)	
	United States B (β)	Sweden B (β)
<i>Class dummy variables</i>		
1. Bourgeoisie	-1.92 (-0.10)***	-3.85 (-0.10)***
2. Small employer	-1.61 (-0.15)***	-2.79 (-0.19)***
3. Petty bourgeoisie	-0.75 (-0.07)*	-1.34 (-0.09)**
4. Expert managers	-2.26 (-0.17)***	-2.98 (-0.19)***
5. Expert supervisors	-1.62 (-0.12)***	-2.15 (-0.13)***
6. Expert workers	-1.00 (-0.07)**	-1.16 (-0.09)**
7. Semi-credentialed managers	-1.17 (-0.11)***	-1.25 (-0.08)**
8. Semi-credentialed supervisors	-1.08 (-0.10)***	-1.62 (-0.09)**
9. Semi-credentialed workers	-0.10 (-0.01)	0.30 (0.04)
10. Uncredentialed managers	-1.09 (-0.06)*	-0.49 (-0.02)
11. Uncredentialed supervisors	-0.30 (-0.03)	-0.35 (-0.02)
<i>Demographic variables</i>		
12. Sex	-0.04 (-0.01)	0.21 (0.03)
13. Age	-0.03 (-0.17)***	0.003 (0.01)
<i>Class biography</i>		
14. Working class trajectory	-0.01 (-0.01)	0.25 (0.14)***
Constant	2.07	1.18
Adjusted R ²	0.09	0.14
N	1463	1188

TABLE 7.7 (continued)

	United States B (β)	Sweden B (β)	Significance level of difference between US and Swedish coefficients in eq. (3)	
			t	sig.
Equation (3)				
<i>Class dummy variables</i>				
1. Bourgeoisie	-0.50 (-0.03)	-1.52 (-0.04)	} <1 ^a ns	
2. Small employers	-0.80 (-0.07)*	-0.71 (-0.05)		
3. Petty bourgeoisie	-0.31 (-0.03)	-0.06 (-0.00)		
4. Expert managers	-1.40 (-0.10)***	-1.51 (-0.10)**		
5. Expert supervisors	-0.83 (-0.06)*	-1.63 (-0.10)**		
6. Expert workers	-0.46 (-0.03)	-0.71 (-0.06)*		
7. Semi-credentialed managers	-0.61 (-0.06)*	-0.70 (-0.04)		
8. Semi-credentialed supervisors	-0.73 (-0.07)*	-1.45 (-0.08)**		
9. Semi-credentialed workers	0.02 (0.00)	0.36 (0.04)		
10. Uncredentialed managers	-0.86 (-0.05)	-0.19 (-0.01)		
11. Uncredentialed supervisors	-0.12 (-0.01)	-0.01 (-0.00)		
<i>Demographic variables</i>				
12. Sex	-0.10 (-0.02)	0.04 (0.01)	<1	ns
13. Age	-0.02 (0.12)***	0.007 (0.03)	3.07	0.002
<i>Class biography</i>				
14. Working class trajectory	-0.06 (-0.03)	0.18 (0.10)**	2.76	0.006
15. Working class networks	0.04 (0.04)	0.11 (0.10)***	1.71	0.08
16. Ever unemployed (dummy)	0.44 (0.08)**	0.93 (0.12)***	1.87	0.06
<i>Class consequences</i>				
17. Personal income (\$1000s)	-0.20 (-0.10)**	-0.43 (-0.11)**	1.44	0.15
18. Unearned income (dummy)	-0.55 (-0.09)***	-0.85 (-0.07)*	<1	ns
19. Home owner (dummy)	-0.35 (-0.07)*	-0.48 (-0.07)**	<1	ns
20. Union member (dummy)	1.33 (0.19)***	1.88 (0.26)***	1.80	0.06
Constant	1.60	-0.14		
Adjusted R ²	0.15	0.23		
N	1243	1003		

Significance levels (two-tailed): *** <0.001; ** <0.01; * <0.05

^aFor the class dummy variables, the significance level is based on a test of the difference between the entire set of class dummy variable coefficients in Sweden and the United States. 'ns' means not significant.

to this equation (variables 14 to 16), the R^2 increases only to 8 per cent in the United States, but 17 per cent in Sweden. The magnitudes and significance levels of the regression coefficients for the class dummy variables in equations 1 and 2 in table 7.7 and the class experience variables in equation 3 are also consistently greater in Sweden. In particular, except for unemployment experience, the class experience variables are at best marginally significant in the United States equations but are quite significant in the Swedish equations. (On these coefficients, the difference between the US and Swedish equations are generally statistically significant). Clearly, class position and class biography are more salient determinants of consciousness in Sweden than in the United States.

Second, in both Sweden and the United States, all of the class-consequences variables have significant effects on consciousness. As in the case of the class dummy variables and the class experience variables, the magnitudes of the raw regression coefficients are greater in Sweden than in the United States for these variables, but the differences are not statistically significant except for the union membership variable. Immediate class experience, measured both by current location and biography, thus appears to be a more salient determinant of consciousness in Sweden than in the United States, whereas the consequences of class-income, home-ownership, etc.—appear to be equally salient in both countries.

Third, in neither the United States nor in Sweden does gender, net of the other variables in the equation have any effect at all on class consciousness, as a measured in this study. On the other hand, the effects of age differ dramatically between the two countries: in equation 3, age is the second best predictor of the consciousness scale in the US, while in Sweden it has no predictive power whatsoever.²⁵ There are several possible explanations for this. Age could constitute a *life-cycle* variable, and it is possible that because of the way labour markets and social security are organized in the two countries there are more antagonisms along age lines in the US than in Sweden. More plausibly, age is a *cohort* variable. The relative historical continuity in Sweden in class politics from the 1930s to the 1980s could explain the absence of any strong cohort effects on class consciousness, whereas in the United States the relative discontinuity represented both by the pre-war and post-war eras, and later, by the experiences of the 1960s could explain the much stronger age effects.

Finally, even though we have observed dramatic differences between Sweden and the United States, if we pool the two samples

into a single equation (not shown) in which country appears as a dummy variable, nationality is by no means the best predictor of consciousness. In this pooled equation, working-class consciousness depends more upon whether or not one is a worker or a union member than whether or not one is a Swede or an American.

Conclusions

The results in this chapter can be summarized in three overarching conclusions. First, the data are systematically consistent with the proposed reconceptualization of class in terms of relations of exploitation. Class attitudes are polarized in the ways predicted by the exploitation-centred concept, and in general they vary across the dimensions of the class typology matrix in the expected monotonic manner.

Second, the data support the thesis that the underlying structure of class relations shapes the overall pattern of class consciousness. As we noted in chapter six, Sweden and the United States are in many respects polar cases among advanced capitalist countries in terms of class formation, state expansion, income inequality, welfare state programmes and so on. Yet, in spite of these dramatic differences, the basic pattern linking class structure to class consciousness is very similar in the two countries: they are both polarized along the three dimensions of exploitation, and the values on the consciousness scale basically vary monotonically as one moves along these dimensions.

Finally, while the overall patterning of consciousness is structurally determined by class relations, the level of working-class consciousness in a given society and the nature of the class coalitions that are built upon those class relations are shaped by the organizational and political practices that characterize the history of class struggle. For all of their reformism and their efforts at building a stable class compromise in Swedish society, the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the associated Swedish labour movement have adopted strategies which reinforce certain aspects of working class consciousness rather than absorbing it into a solid bourgeois ideological hegemony.

These strategies have affected each of the three elements of class consciousness discussed earlier: perceptions of alternatives, theories of consequences and preferences (or understandings of interests). To a much greater extent than in the United States, the

discourse of politics in Sweden often explicitly involves 'class'. The very name given in the mass media to the Conservative parties in Sweden—the 'bourgeois parties'—reflects this salience accorded class in defining the terrain of politics. But more important than the use of words, the Social Democratic Party has been an arena in which issues of power and property have been debated and become part of the agenda of politics in Sweden. The effect of these debates has been to emphasize the existence of alternatives to the existing distributions of power and property. Proposals such as the Meidner plan—a programme currently under consideration to gradually erode private-capitalist ownership of the principal means of production through the use of union controlled investment funds—illustrate this well. The Meidner plan has been widely debated as a proposal to transform power relations in the society as a whole. Even though the more radical versions of the proposal have not received wide support, the very fact of the debate itself opens up the terrain of alternatives.

The strategies of parties and unions in Sweden have also had the effect of shaping the real and perceived interests of various categories of wage-earners. State-welfare policies pursued by the Social Democratic Party have generally had a relatively universal character to them, distributing benefits of different sorts to most categories of wage earners, thus reducing the tendency for wage earners in contradictory exploiting class locations to see their interests as polarized with those in exploited positions. Above all, perhaps, the effectiveness of the Swedish labour movement in massively unionizing white-collar employees and even substantial segments of managerial employees, has heightened the degree of perceived community of interests among wage earners in different class positions. This does not imply that the objective basis of conflicts of interests among wage earners in different classes has disappeared, but simply that their common interests as capitalistically exploited wage-earners have assumed greater weight relative to their differential interests with respect to organization and credential exploitation.

In contrast to the Swedish case, political parties and unions in the United States have engaged in practices which, wittingly or unwittingly, have undermined working-class consciousness. The Democratic Party has systematically displaced political discourse from a language of class. While there are exceptions of course, the general tendency has been to organize social conflicts in non-class ways and to emphasize the extremely limited range of alternatives

for dealing with problems of power and property. State welfare policies have tended to heighten rather than reduce class-based divisions among wage earners. And the ineffectiveness of the labour movement to unionize even a majority of manual industrial workers, let alone white collar employees, has meant that the perceived divisions of exploitation-based interests among wage-earners have tended to be large relative to their common interests vis-à-vis capital. As a result, as the rhetoric of the 1984 Presidential campaign demonstrated, the labour movement is regarded as a 'special interest' group in the United States, rather than a representative of the general economic interests of wage-earners.

The net result of these differences in the political strategies and ideologies of parties and unions in the two countries is that class has considerably greater ideological salience in Sweden than in the United States: class location and class experiences have a bigger impact on class consciousness; classes are more polarized ideologically; and the working class coalition built upon that more polarized ideological terrain is much bigger.

Notes

1. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, Cambridge, Mass. 1971, (original edition), 1922, p. 51.
2. Lukács himself, in a footnote (*ibid.* n. 11, p. 81), suggests that there is a relationship between his argument and Max Weber's ideal types, but he fails to elaborate the connection.
3. An 'objective teleology of history' implies that there exists some objectively given end-state of history or 'goal' of history, distinct from the goals and objectives of human individuals, which determines the actual trajectory of historical development.
4. There is one sense in which one could legitimately refer to class 'consciousness' as a property of a collectivity, namely when consciousness is used to describe the practices themselves and not simply the forms of subjectivity that shape the intentional choices implicated in those practices. Since the actual practices involve the use of organizational resources and various other kinds of collective capacities, when the term 'consciousness' is extended to cover the practices as such, then it is no longer strictly an attribute of individuals. I prefer to limit the expression consciousness to the subjective dimensions of the problem and use the term 'capacities' to describe the collectively organized resources used in struggles, and the term 'practices' to describe the individual and collective activities that result from the linkage of individual consciousness and collective capacities.
5. The abstract conceptualization of consciousness and class consciousness adopted in this chapter is rooted in a view of human action that is sometimes referred to as 'rational choice' or 'strategic action' theory. For an important elaboration of this theoretical tradition and its relation to Marxism, which has been

influential in the formulations adopted here, see Jon Elster, 'Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory', *Theory and Society*, vol. 11, no. 4, July 1982, pp. 453-485; and *Making Sense of Marx*, Cambridge 1985.

6. Göran Therborn, *The Power of Ideology and the Ideology of Power*, London 1980, p. 2.

7. The term 'subjectivity' has a rather vague theoretical status. It is not clear whether it refers only to the conscious dimensions of the psyche—i.e. those aspects of the psyche that make people 'subjects'—or whether it is basically used to designate all facets of the psyche. Given Therborn's emphasis on consciousness in his discussion of ideology, I suspect that he is using the term subjectivity in the narrower sense.

8. Ideology and culture are not two distinct kinds of events in the world. In the actual practices of social actors they are continually intertwined. The distinction being made is between the kinds of effects produced by given practices. Ideological effects are effects centred on consciousness and cognition; cultural effects are effects centred on nonconscious aspects of subjectivity.

9. For useful related discussions of the problem of 'objective interests', see Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School*, Cambridge 1981, pp. 45-551; Issac Balbus, 'The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxist Analysis', *Politics & Society*, February, 1971; Ted Benton, 'Objective Interests and the Sociology of Power', *Sociology*, vol. 15, no. 2, May, 1981, pp. 161-84; Steven Lukes, *Power: a Radical View*, London, 1974; William Connolly, 'On Interests in Politics', *Politics & Society*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1972, pp. 459-77; Jon Elster, *Sour Grapes*, Cambridge 1983.

10. Freedom is not simply the absence of restraint, but the capacity to act. For a systematic discussion of this concept which bears on the present discussion, see Andrew Levine, *Arguing for Socialism*, London 1984, pp. 20-49.

11. Simple material interests in income and consumption are one instance of this general interest in freedom: being exploited is a restriction on freedom, since it reduces one's capacity to act in that material resources are crucial constituents of that capacity. In these terms, as Levine brilliantly shows, equality is not really a value distinct from freedom, since inequalities are an important impediment to freedom itself.

12. See in particular the conceptual typologies of class consciousness proposed by D. W. Livingstone, *Class and Class Consciousness in Advanced Capitalism*, Toronto 1984, (unpublished manuscript); Michael Mann, *Class Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class*, London 1973; Bertell Ollmann, 'Toward Class Consciousness in the Working Class', *Politics & Society*, Fall 1972, pp. 1-24; Therborn, *op. cit.*

13. See, for example, Gordon Marshall, 'Some Remarks on the Study of Working Class Consciousness', *Politics & Society*, vol. 12, no. 3, 1983, pp. 263-302.

14. For example, Marxists often argue that the distinction between explaining social problems in individualist terms ('the poor are poor because they are lazy') instead of social structural terms ('the poor are poor because of the way capitalism generates inequalities') is an aspect of class consciousness. While I accept this claim, it does require a fairly strong commitment to the Marxist theory of mystification.

15. See appendix II, table II.7 for a detailed presentation of the logic for constructing this typology.

16. We should have asked all respondents including currently self-employed, whether or not they had been self-employed in the past. This would have enabled

us to have built this variable strictly as an historical experience variable uncontaminated by the respondent's current situation. Unfortunately, the prior-self-employment questions were only asked of people currently not self-employed.

17. Only eleven dummy variables are needed, since the twelfth category corresponds to a value of zero on all of the others. In the simple case of a dichotomy—which is a typology with two cells—only one dummy variable is needed, for example men = 0 and women = 1. It would be redundant to have a complimentary variable with the values reversed.

18. In this table we have combined people who spontaneously say that they are in the working class in the open-ended version of the question with those who say that they are in the working class in the closed-ended follow-up.

19. In the United States, expert managers are slightly more pro-capitalist than the bourgeoisie itself, but the difference between them is not statistically significant. It should be remembered in this context that most respondents in what I am calling the 'bourgeoisie' are still fairly modest capitalists. 83 per cent of these capitalists employ less than fifty employees. Only 8 per cent of expert managers, on the other hand, work for businesses with less than fifty employees. It is to be expected that if we had data on a sample of large capitalists, the results would be somewhat different.

20. These estimates are based on the following aggregations from table 7.1: Swedish bourgeois coalition = cells 1, 2, 4; US bourgeois coalition = cells 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10; Swedish working class coalition = cells 6, 9, 10, 11, 12 (low estimate) and also 7, 8 (high estimate); US working class coalition = cells 9, 11, 12. Note that in neither country is the petty bourgeoisie—category 3—part of either coalition.

21. For an explanation of the procedures used to calculate the adjusted means and their interpretation, see the discussion of statistical procedures on p. 258 above.

22. In calculating the adjusted means in table 7.6, we depart from the procedure discussed earlier in one respect: for the union-membership dummy variable it does not make sense to 'adjust' the means of capitalists by the socially average contribution of this variable to consciousness, since none of them can be union members. The counterfactual question implicit in the procedure used to adjust the mean values—what would be the expected consciousness of capitalists if the socially average proportion of them were union members—does not make sense. I have therefore evaluated the union membership dummy variable at zero (i.e. the appropriate value for capitalists) when calculating the adjusted means for owners of the means of production.

23. If the intervening variables included in the regression in fact measured all of the mechanisms which translated class location into class consciousness, then the adjusted means would all be identical.

24. There is a further ambiguity with this variable, referred to in the note to table 6.18, since some self-employed respondents regarded all of their income as income from investments, whereas others treated the question as referring only to investments other than in their own businesses. Only about 55 per cent of the US capitalists in the sample stated that they had any investment income.

25. The US age coefficient is statistically significantly larger than the Swedish coefficient at the .002 confidence level.

Conclusion

This book began by arguing that contemporary Marxist class analysis has been attempting to bridge the gap between the abstract, polarized structural map of classes and the concrete conjunctural analysis of class formation and class struggle. In this study our main preoccupation has been to approach this problem by systematically rethinking the structural categories themselves in a way suitable for incorporation into middle-level theories and empirical research. While we have explored many diverse problems, three overarching conclusions seem particularly important: the first concerns the viability of the proposed reconceptualization of class structure; the second involves the salient features of contemporary capitalist class structures using this reconceptualization; and the third is about the role of politics in class analysis.

The Exploitation Centred Concept of Class

My earlier work on class structure suffered, I have argued, from the tendency to displace the concept of exploitation from the centre of class analysis. This weakened the sense in which class relations were intrinsically relations of objectively opposed interests, and posed a series of specific conceptual difficulties.

These difficulties, combined with my empirical research on class structure and my encounter with the theoretical work of John Roemer, have precipitated the reconceptualization of class relations in terms of the multidimensional view of exploitation elaborated in chapter three. Classes in capitalist society, I now argue, should be seen as rooted in the complex intersection of three forms of exploitation: exploitation based on the ownership of capital assets, the control of organization assets and the possession of skill or credential assets. While I have some reservations