

13 The rise of the modern state: III. Bureaucratization

The term “bureaucracy” is ubiquitous in historical work on the emergence of the modern state. Yet it is rarely defined and often misused. This is a pity, for since Weber, sociologists have generally used the term precisely. Weber (1978: I, 220–1) identified ten constituent elements of bureaucracy:

1. Officials are free, subject to authority only in their official tasks.
2. Officials are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence.
4. Offices are filled by free contract.
5. Candidates for office are selected according to their qualifications, normally examinations and technical training.
6. Officials are salaried and granted pensions.
7. The office is the sole or primary occupation of the incumbent.
8. The office constitutes a career, involving promotion by seniority or for achievement.
9. The official is separated from ownership of the means of administration.
10. The official is subject to systematic discipline and control in official conduct.

This is surely more detail than we need – and research in modern-day offices demonstrates that most of the ten are closely interrelated (Hall 1963–4). For purposes of macrohistorical generalization, I have simplified Weber’s ten into five key characteristics of bureaucracy, two of personnel, two of offices, and one indicating their relationship to the wider society:

Bureaucrats are officials (1) separated from ownership of office by an employed, salaried status and (2) appointed, promoted, and dismissed according to impersonal criteria of competence.

Bureaucratic offices are (3) organized within departments, each of which is centralized and embodies a functional division of labor; (4) departments are integrated into a single overall administration, also embodying functional division of labor and centralized hierarchy.

Finally, bureaucracy presupposes (5) *insulation* from the wider society’s struggles over values. Weber saw bureaucracy as dominated by “formal” or “instrumental” rationality, insulating it from the “substantive” rationality embedded in the politics and values of society. Bureaucracies are efficient at implementing substantive goals set from outside their own administration. If an administration imports substantive or value rationality and party struggles, then it is embedded in

society, reducing its formal rationality. Bureaucracy presupposes the insulation of administration from politics.

These five elements may be present in varying degrees, and each may be present without the others – although element 2 without 1 is unlikely and 5 tends to presuppose the rest. Administrations may be more or less bureaucratic, but full-fledged bureaucracy requires all five. It is also a universal, nationally uniform type of civil administration. Bureaucratization has accompanied and encouraged the growth of national states.

Given that most Western states are now largely bureaucratic, this chapter asks two simple empirical questions: When did they become so, and why? I claim not to give wholly original answers to these questions but, rather, to synthesize existing research literature. As is well known, states mostly bureaucratized in this period, but each of my five states proved at some point to be the pioneer as they all reacted to the entwinings of the sources of social power. Yet bureaucratization remained incomplete (as it still does today), especially at the top of administrations. As in militaries, bureaucratization and officials’ social identities restrained one another to produce a dual crystallization within state administration: As an “elite,” it was mildly technocratic-bureaucratic; as a “party,” it largely reflected the policy of dominant classes. States were still not unitary.

Old regime administration

As Chapter 12 shows, bureaucracy entered states mainly through their armed forces, substantially bureaucratized well before civilian administrations. By 1760, military reforms were impacting on civil administration, especially in supply departments of navies and in fiscal departments. Yet this still had not gone very far. In eighteenth-century civil administration, the very notion of “employment” is dubious. There were five office-holding statuses and four forms of remuneration.

Office holding

1. At the highest levels office holding was dominated by hereditary ownership – the monarch’s own position, of course. High offices could be passed directly to male heirs. Apart from royal families and ladies-in-waiting, there were no female holders of high office in this period.
2. The official could be elected, usually by his peers, holding office for life or a fixed term.
3. Offices could be purchased. In strict law these could rarely be transmitted to heirs, but in practice they often become hereditary, indistinguishable from status 1.

4. Offices could be acquired through the patronage of a higher official, often sweetened with a bribe. Ownership rights rested with the patron not the client official, who might be terminated at the patron's pleasure.
5. An office might be acquired and terminated in the modern way by impersonal criteria such as ability or experience, in which case no one owned it.

Remuneration

1. Many officials received no formal remuneration, but performed honorific duties flowing from their social rank.
2. Officials enjoyed the fruits of office, that is, to appropriate fees and perquisites flowing through it.
3. The salary was paid not to the person doing the office work (as in the modern manner) but to a sinecurist patron who then employed and paid a deputy to do the work.
4. A salary was paid in the modern way to the working official.

There are many possible combinations of office-holding statuses and remunerations, although a few combinations dominated. Only one combination – nonowning, salaried, working officials – can be regarded as potential bureaucrats, who were thus a small minority of mid-eighteenth-century state officials. The rest were embedded in particularistic, decentralized, and segmental forms of administrative control. As Weber noted, bureaucracy presupposes separating the official from his means of administration (he was playing upon Marx's definition of the proletariat). For administration to be bureaucratic, officials must find no profit in their decisions, they must be controllable by the administrative hierarchy, and they must be removable if they do not follow impersonal administrative rules. These conditions could not be met in the eighteenth century, because officials or their patrons *owned* offices and could derive profit from them. The property rights of owners and patrons blocked centralization, rationalization, and insulation of state administrations.

Their rights look to us like "corruption" – and they were eventually recognized as such and abolished. But in the eighteenth century such rights constituted a kind of "administrative representation," restraining royal despotism by allowing local-regional parties of the dominant classes to share control of state administration. Embryo party democracy in Britain and Holland meant not only parliaments; and in absolutist Austria, Prussia, and France, office ownership was the main restraint against centralized despotism, reducing state autonomy. In fact it makes it difficult to talk about the "state" as an actor. Old regime officials were highly embedded in civil society.

Then came two attempts at reform, the first from absolutism, the second a revolutionary and reformist redefinition of representation, from office owning toward democracy.

Phase 1: dynastic monarchy and war, 1700–1780

The first modern bureaucratic tracklayers were dynastic monarchs, formally above local-regional society in their military and civil powers. The administration of royal household and private domains actually belonged to the monarch, now also the undisputed commander in chief of the armed forces. The state elite did potentially exist as an "it," an actor, in the personages of the entourage, the friends, the relations, and the servants of the monarch. This "it" comprised only a fairly small part of the monarchical core, not the whole state. Outside were parties of nobles, high clerics, and local notables exercising effective autonomy in their own administrative spheres. Actual despotic power was limited by feeble infrastructural powers, typified by depending on local-regional – and sometimes also central – officials who owned their offices. Dynastic monarchies crystallized as dual: centralizing dynasts and decentralized old regime parties, played out as factionalism and intrigue at court and in administration.

For slightly different reasons, the two least representative regimes, the Hohenzollern and Habsburg dynasties of Prussia and Austria, launched an eighteenth-century bureaucratic offensive. Other German states, Sweden, and then Russia also joined in. The first major ideological movement for state reform, cameralism, appeared mainly in the universities of Lutheran North Germany and Roman Catholic Austria (Johnson 1969; Raeff 1975; Krygier 1979; Tribe 1984, 1988). Throughout the eighteenth century cameralists developed a "science of administration," arguing that state departments (*Kammer*) should be centralized, rationalized, informed by systematic statistics gathering, and subject to universal administrative and fiscal rules. This would better attain three policy goals: providing good order, encouraging subjects' (not citizens') economic activities, and routinely extracting their wealth as revenue. Their favorite metaphor was a machine.

A properly constituted state must be exactly analogous to a machine, in which all the wheels and gears are precisely adjusted to one another; and the ruler must be the foreman, the main-spring, or the soul . . . which sets everything in motion. [Justi, a cameralist, quoted by Krygier 1979: 17]

Early eighteenth-century cameralists were jurists, university professors, and prominent officials or their advisers, urging monarchs to abandon particularism. These "subservient bureaucrats" (Johnson's term) were then swept up into Central European enlightened absolutism, urging wholesale state reform. Anticlericalism also characterized Austrian cameralism. By 1790, there were more than thirty professors of cameralism in German and Austrian universities and about sixty

published textbooks on the subject. Then cameralism faded before the influence of French Physiocrats and British political economists (Tribe 1988). The Central European statist phase of theorizing "modernization" gave ground before the British capitalist phase.

The Habsburg state was more dynastic and so more insulated from civil society than any state to the West. It was a gigantic confederation in which the royal central government and army constituted a separate tier apart from noble-dominated estate and lordship administrations of its many provinces and historic kingdoms. As Chapter 10 shows, the Habsburgs worked a protection racket: The provinces agreed to Habsburg despotic rule to avoid the potentially worse despotism of others and one another. The royal core was a neutral "it," relatively unconstrained by representative office holding – in this Catholic country many officials and officers were "neutral" foreigners and Protestants; later, many were Jews.

The main reform burst occurred in response to the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–8), a concerted attempt by surrounding Powers to dismember the Habsburg domains on the accession of a woman, Maria Theresa. Facing elimination, forced back on her core royal domains, the energetic queen economized and maximized the fiscal resources under the joint models provided by cameralism and Prussian military administration. Her high officials were particularly goaded by the sight of the Prussian army extracting double the revenue from Silesia that they themselves had managed before 1740, when it had been an Austrian province (Axtmann 1991). The Austrian army was finally subordinated to the monarchy and professionalized. Most high royal officials became salaried, and their pensions were converted into a single rationalized pension fund, earlier than elsewhere. From 1776 on, high officials had to show evidence of having studied cameralism, and universities and the press were liberalized and secularized. Most central state departments – especially the Vienna City Bank (effectively the treasury), the mines and coinage department, and the *Camerale* (core ministries) – now became bureaucratically organized. All this was reflected in the early emergence of Austrian census statistics revealed in Table 11.7.

Austrian bureaucratization, however, had two limits. First, individual departments were not integrated into a single functional and hierarchical structure. They coexisted in Vienna with earlier state institutions centered on the court. There was no single enduring cabinet, no effective first minister, but rather plural councils and ministers competing for access to the monarch and influence at court. Social ties among monarchy, court, church, high military officers, and administrators were so close that we can identify them as a state

elite, if rarely a united one. But the Austrian state was not a single bureaucracy. It was a monarchy whose goals were implemented through interpenetrating administrations infiltrated by parties.

Second, this partial bureaucratization characterized only the central royal tier of government, mainly in Vienna, sitting above the local-regional administrations of Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, and so forth, whose offices were elected by the estates or owned by local notables and church dignitaries. As Table 4.2 indicates, the royal administration had less provincial infrastructural power than states whose officials were more embedded there. Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II were carrying out ambitious "enlightened" projects in the largest empire in Europe, but they could not institutionalize them there. Joseph II struggled hard and consciously against regional particularism, but he lost. Hungarian nobles and Low Country nobles, merchants, and clerics rebelled in the name of particularistic liberties and representative privileges. Both began negotiating with Prussia (offering a rival protection racket) when Joseph pushed them too far. His successor, Leopold, restored their liberties and offices. Enlightened absolutism retreated into its capital (Macartney 1969; Beales 1987; Dickson 1987; Axtmann 1991). An autonomous, protobureaucratic eighteenth-century state was infrastructurally a feeble one. The Austrian state failed to bureaucratize and modernize much further from this base.

Prussian administration is almost invariably (though not helpfully) called the "bureaucracy" by historians on whose empirical research I rely (Rosenberg 1958; Fischer and Lundgreen 1975: 509–27; Gray 1986; but Johnson 1975 differs). Its royal state core also moved early toward bureaucratic personnel – again under the pressure of war. Here the innovator was less directly cameralism, more the army. As Prussia triumphed through testing midcentury wars, an expanding military-fiscal administration enveloped the royal domains, regalian rights (the mint and mines), estates, and townships. Under Frederick William I, a general directory of four ministers supervised provincial boards of war and domains, overseeing tax commissars and county commissioners (*Landräte*). A minister famously commented: "Prussia was not a country with an army, but an army with a country which served as headquarters and food magazine" (Rosenberg 1958: 40).

Thus, after 1750, there was little office owning. Central and high-level local-regional officials drew salaries and pensions and were appointed and dismissed by the monarch. Under cameralist influence, the late 1730s saw training and examining of judges. By 1780, judges had to have earned a university law degree, undertaken two years of in-service training, and then passed an examination (Weill 1961; Johnson 1975: 106–33). The requirement of taking entrance examinations

spread throughout the higher administration between 1770 and 1800. A university degree became the normal qualification, giving officials "national" cultural cohesion – the universities were the principal transmitters of "German" identity. The law code of 1794 reinforced all these and granted officials legal tenure conditional on competent performance of their duties. They were now titled not royal servants but "professional officials of the state" (*Beamten des Staats*). They were indeed bureaucrats, perhaps uniquely in the world at the time. Prussia had overtaken Austria as tracklayer of bureaucracy. As a "national" bureaucracy, Prussia was way ahead.

Yet Prussian bureaucratization also had limits. Like its progenitor, the army, it crystallized as *old regime* because it was a compromise with nobles, especially Junkers. As Table 4.2 indicates, the Prussian state was infrastructurally effective because it centrally coordinated the state elite with parties drawn from the dominant class. Then came the tensions of state modernization and bourgeois expansion. Until the 1820s, few nobles went to the universities, and the conflict between privately educated, "practical" notable officials and university-educated wealthy-commoner and "national" officials was openly acknowledged. Monarchs steered between them, wary of both too much noble control and the threat of a bureaucratic caste. In Prussia (and later in Russia) struggles between old regime and substantial bourgeoisie occurred within state administration.

The Prussian struggles were successfully compromised. Bourgeois professionals were admitted, and nobles became educated. Most high civil and military officers remained noble right up to the major expansion of army, navy, and civil administration just before 1900, when finally nobles could not supply enough sons (Bonin 1966; Koselleck 1967: 435; Gillis 1971: 30; military data presented in Chapter 12). Indeed, as the Junkers were now losing their economic power, they depended more on civil service careers (Muncie 1944). Examinations were also qualifying rather than competitive. Higher officials could select who they liked, provided the candidate passed. They selected their own, and administration remained embedded in the old regime. Thus officials served the crown, yet also enjoyed independence conferred by their class. Like officials of other German states, they often chose not to carry out directives they disliked (Blanning 1974: 191).

Prussian civil administration also crystallized as *militarist*. Administrators were put into uniforms and given formal rank. Militarism also spread through the middle and lower levels (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975: 520–1). Army mobilization depended on a large pool of trained reservists, especially noncommissioned officers. What to do with these veterans at war's end, and how to keep them motivated for the

next one? Even in the eighteenth century, the Hohenzollerns urged ministers to find state employment for ex-soldiers. Veterans were preferred as city gate comptrollers, factory inspectors, policemen, elementary school teachers, even clergymen, and later as railway employees. From 1820 on, all noncommissioned officers with nine years' service could claim preferment in clerical and accounting jobs in the administration, provided they were literate and could count. Austria later guaranteed this for twelve-year noncommissioned officers, and France wrote similar practices into law in 1872. Even many twentieth-century German civil service rules concerned discipline and punishment, and regulations enshrined the primacy of public order over other goals and of the military in enforcing it. Martial law remained a hardy perennial of Prussian-German administration (Ludtke 1989).

These two crystallizations, as old regime and militarist, gave a distinctively "Prussian" cast to administration. Both enhanced control across and down the administration, less by Weber's rational accounting procedures than by that combination of esprit de corps and disciplined fear that is the hallmark of an effective military aristocracy. This modern administration was permeated by traditional class and military power relations.

The third limitation on Prussian bureaucracy operated in the opposite direction, to reduce state homogeneity. Prussia failed to integrate different administrative departments, just like Austria. Within departments arose hierarchy, order, and career structure. But relations between departments remained confused. The general directory had emerged from a wartime crisis, invasion. Some of its ministers had territorial, others functional, spheres of competence. At first they sat collectively in the royal privy council, but this body fell into disuse under Frederick the Great – he wanted power to centralize on him, not ministers. His segmental divide-and-rule policy reduced bureaucratization and aborted any prime minister who might constitute a power rival (Anderson and Anderson 1967: 37). The so-called cabinets were not councils of ministers but of court advisers liaising independently with ministries. As Prussia expanded, new agencies proliferated alongside old ministries:

Five primary bureaucracies operated at cross purposes, in opposition to one another and recognized only the king as a common master. . . . No single bureaucracy existed after 1740, and functions were not divided up logically and assigned to persons placed in a bureaucratic hierarchy. The Prussian government became more and more decentralized . . . divided into mutually antagonistic parts. [Johnson 1975: 274]

Administration mixed two principles of accountability, collegial decision making by corps of officials and the "one-man principle"

favored by most reformers. Prussian administration was not singular and centralized. At its higher levels, it fed into an aristocratic court centered on a monarch unwilling to abandon segmentalism. Ministers, even chancellors after this post developed, relied on court intrigue along with formal administrative position to exert influence. The goal was to secure direct access to the monarch. Absolutism had only the fictional unity of the monarch. It could not be bureaucratic, whatever the employment status of its officials.

Yet the Austrian and Prussian states were the most bureaucratic of the eighteenth century. Each reinforced dynastic monarchy with a further autonomy, emerging from Austrian dynastic confederalism and Prussian militarism. France, though formally absolutist, had no such insulation. Centuries of accommodation to the privileges of provincial nobles and corporate groups had embedded even its highest levels in civil society in what can only be described as a peculiarly corrupt and particularistic form of "representation" (Bosher 1970; Mousnier 1970: 17 ff.; Fischer and Lundgreen 1975: 490–509; Church 1981).

The French state had two main employment statuses. Most officials were called *officiers*, owning their office, usually by purchase, their property rights protected by corporate bodies. A minority were termed *commissaires*, salaried working employees. The boundaries between the two kept shifting, as *commissaires* sought ownership and the king struggled to reduce venality. By the 1770s, there were at most 50,000 salaried, removable officials, predominantly in the ministries, customs posts, and post offices. They were dwarfed by, and usually subordinate to, *officiers*. Necker (1784) estimated 51,000 venal offices in law courts, municipalities, and financial offices alone. To this we should add venal offices in the royal household, in tax farming, and in other financial companies used by the state and offices held by guild inspectors, inspectors, and masters – even wigmakers. Taylor (1967: 477) and Doyle (1984: 833) estimate the total at 2 percent to 3 percent of the adult male population – about 200,000 persons. We should then add perhaps 100,000 of the 215,000 part-time revenue collectors estimated by Necker (the others may be already counted as venal offices above). Some of these were venal, some salaried. I hazard a guess that at most 20 percent of the officials were salaried *commissaires*. But it is only a guess, as nobody knew – which is actually the most significant finding (as I noted more generally in Chapter 11).

There were no impersonal rules for appointment or promotion in any department. Most high officials had prior legal training, but this was normal for cultivated men, rather than technical administrative training (which it partly was in Prussia). Perhaps 5 percent of French officials can be called bureaucrats on our two Weberian indices of

personnel. The state was riddled with private and corporate property rights, thoroughly embedded in civil society.

Nor did its offices have much bureaucratic organization, within or between departments. Within the key ministries, hierarchy developed from the 1770s on, involving salary differentials and career lines. But even there, and rampant elsewhere, ownership rights cut across hierarchical and functional flows of information and control, as they did in relations between departments. French administration mixed collegial and one-man rule, and then aborted both. The old *conseil d'état* had specialized into various councils, some absorbed into the court. As in most countries the finance minister had emerged as the key official. But he had no particular status within councils or court, and he had little authority even over much of the sprawling financial administration. In the provinces much turned upon the energy of the individual intendant and his small staff, but they needed to collaborate amicably with local notables, replete with particularistic privileges.

Reformers knew what a rational, modern administration would look like, for the French Enlightenment drew upon cameralism (though with more explosive political demands). And in ministers like Necker they had patrons who counted numbers and costs, who eliminated what corruption they could, and who sought to reorganize broad administrative swathes (no one could comprehend, let alone reform, the whole). But their progress, as Necker admitted, was limited:

Subdelegates, officers of the *election*, managers, receivers and controllers of the *vingtièmes*, commissioners and collectors of the *taille*, officials of the *gabelles*, inspectors, process-servers, *corvée* bosses, agents of the *aides*, the *contrôle*, the reserved imposts; all these men of the fisc, each according to his character, subjugates to his small authority and entwines in his fiscal science the ignorant taxpayer, unable to know whether he is being cheated or not, but who constantly suspects and fears it. [quoted in Harris 1979: 97]

The principal twentieth-century scholar has agreed: "The old regime never had a budget, never had a legislative act foreseeing and authorising the total of receipts and expenses for a given period of time. . . . It only knew fragmented, incomplete states" (Marion 1927: I, 448).

Thus I find it bizarre that some historians are attracted to the word "bureaucracy" to describe this state. For example, Harris refers to the Royal General Farms – that monument to office holding as private property and profit – as "that enormous bureaucratic apparatus" (1979: 75). There were few traces of bureaucracy in old regime France.

Dynasticism saw some bureaucratic modernization, but administration was only insulated from classes at the highest royal level in Prussia and especially in Austria. Overall this seems less significant

than party domination by an old regime that was simultaneously politicized classes and embedded officials. This was especially marked in France. In Britain and its American colonies we also find highly embedded old regimes – but in an embryo party democracy, containing parliamentary party factions as well as corrupt officeholders. This combination produced a British administration as cohesive as Prussia's, but one far less bureaucratized. (For the British-Prussian comparison, see Mueller 1984.)

Until nearly 1800 in Britain, salaried, working higher officials were greatly outnumbered by sinecurists drawing salary or fruits of office, employing deputies to do the actual work. Virtually all three hundred Exchequer offices were filled by deputies (Binney 1958: 232–3). In the Navy Department, the treasurer appointed and paid his own paymaster to do his work, and the two auditors of imprest kept most of their considerable salaries (more than £16,000 and £10,000 per year) even after paying all departmental expenses. In 1780, it was publicly revealed that neither had actually intervened in the work of his department for more than thirty years. In the office of the secretary of state, even the office cleaner employed another (Cohen 1941: 24–6). There were no preset qualifications or examinations for office and no formal criteria for promotion except in Customs and Excise and technical Navy departments. Even they had merely formalized patronage into written recommendations (Aylmer 1979: 94–5).

There could be no centralized chain of command between or even within departments. At every level it was frustrated by autonomous property rights to office. But in the eighteenth century changes occurred. The First Lord of the Treasury was gradually becoming “prime” minister, in the House of Lords representing the monarch to Parliament. Beneath him were two major secretaries of state and junior ministers and boards running specific departments. Yet monarch and members of both houses had independent channels of influence and patronage inside departments.

Public business was carried on in a number of more or less independent offices, which were subject to no supervision either as regards their methods of work or the details of their expenditure. . . . [T]he First Lord of the Treasury could not make a tolerable guess at the expenses of government for any one year. [Cohen 1941: 34]

There were no attempts to count officials until 1797.

As in France, “corruption” was sturdily defended, but in Britain it was centralized, national corruption, for its fountainheads were the sovereign and his ministries in Parliament. It brought rewards for owners and patrons, but it also ensured that royal administration

could work only *through* the “protonational” parties of the propertied classes. Administration was not insulated from politics or class. Its corrupt, particularistic “representation” was appropriate to late agrarian societies like Britain and France. On the one hand, they lacked the communications and the party disciplines that later reinforced parliamentary representation in industrial capitalism; on the other hand, their populations and capitalisms were outgrowing rule by particularistic kin networks radiating downward from Royal Council or Parliament. In France administrative representation produced inefficient administration, but in Britain it was highly efficient. It remained virtually unchanged until the 1780s, despite the extraordinary transformation of civil society.

Yet British bureaucracy stirred when state militarism escalated fiscal pressures – first in the technical branches of the navy (not the more aristocratic army), then in the customs and excise tax offices. Brewer (1989) shows that the Excise Department became the first civilian administration directly controlled by higher state officials. Four thousand eight hundred persons, most of them salaried, were implicated in a “proto-organization chart” (although this figurative device had not yet been invented), embodying formal channels of functional and hierarchical communication and control, submitting regular written reports, actually delivering predictable revenues (unusual in the eighteenth century). It contrasted to the corrupt administration of the venerable land tax, bearing down on property owners who had elaborated office owning in self-defense. The excise tax had been introduced by an unusually effective despotic state, Cromwell's Commonwealth. Though constitutionally controversial, its extraction had not caused much pain among the old regime. It was a tax on the excess profits of commerce and on the consumption of the powerless poor – and it financed profitable global expansion. Yet the Excise Department was a potential Trojan horse. Its bureaucratic model was hailed in the 1780s by reformers urging parliamentary commissions of enquiry.

There were now also outside pressures toward a bureaucratic and, more ambivalently, toward a national administration. Chapter 4 charts the growth of a national “economic reform” movement inveighing against waste and corruption. It had two sources of inspiration. First, as elsewhere, came the fiscal pressure of modern war. The movement was created by the Seven Years' War, its first actual reforms pressured by the American Revolution. But second, it resonated ideologically amid the national alliance of old regime “outs” and emerging “excluded” petite bourgeoisie. This alliance also owed much to the diffusion of commercial, then industrial, capitalism. So did its theory of efficient administration. Utilitarianism differed from cameralism:

Its rationality was formal, systemic, and decentered, governed by principles underlying relations in civil society, needing less authoritative state guidance. I detect the influence of the "invisible hand" of the world's most capitalist economy.

I have charted a first phase of state modernization and bureaucratization. This was toward countable, working, salaried, qualified officials and toward functional and hierarchical rationalization of individual departments. As yet there was little change on the fourth and fifth criteria of bureaucracy, integrating different departments and separating party politics and administration. The main reforms had come from power relations that do not seem very "modern." The early moves came in the least representative monarchies, Austria and Prussia, absolute dynasties, poorly equipped with commerce, industry, and urbanization (as Aylmer 1979: 103 also notes). Dynasticism could be an "it," an insulated centralized actor capable of reorganizing "itself" with the aid of a conscious science of administration. Austrian and Prussian dynasticisms were reinforced by their confederal and militarist crystallizations. By contrast, in (embryo) party-democratic Britain, administration was royal *and* embedded – centralized and decentralized; so was Parliament, split between court and country parties, placemen and county gentry. Any reform must be agreed to by both parties. Yet corruption had been institutionalized by their historic compromise, buying the crown influence and notables freedom from despotism. In this respect the French regime, formally dynastic but embedded and "corruptly representative" almost up to its head, resembled the British. But Prussian and Austrian monarchs had higher administrations that were theirs to modernize. Cameralism could be thought there, not in Britain. True, dynasts could only penetrate their realms by compromising with nobility and church, embedded in local-regional administrations. But, unlike in Britain (or its American colonies), nobody questioned the monarch's right to administer his or her own.

Dynasts were also spurred toward reform by the pressure of land wars, which were most severe in Central Europe. The rhythms of state modernization were supplied by the fiscal and manpower strains of militarism: military-fiscal administrations were the first to be rationalized (the Prussian judiciary, an apparent exception, was closely linked to military administration); and, especially in Prussia, the military provided organizational models. The pressure was felt in France, too, but the regime was unable to carry military reforms into fiscal departments. When the Napoleonic Wars eventually brought comparable military-fiscal burdens to Britain, reform would come too, and through a similar departmental route.

Thus the first phase of bureaucratization was caused less by a "modern" capitalist civil society than by states' traditional military crystallizations, most intensely experienced in the least representative monarchies. There was one exception to this: pressures exerted by British bourgeois and petit bourgeois reformers, in this period unsuccessful. Bureaucratization was coming primarily from the old monarchical and military state, not the new civil society, its limits set primarily by that state's contradictions: rational administration versus segmental divide and rule and autonomy from, yet dependence on, the nobility.

Causes of early bureaucratization = military

Phase 2: revolution, reform, and representation, 1780–1850

In this period, state modernization shifted into tracks defined primarily by struggles over political representation and national citizenship that were led by revolutionaries. The American Revolution has historical precedence.¹ With independence achieved, there could be no American return to "old corruption." Despotism was to be avoided by making the state small and answerable to elected bodies. In principle, state rationalization was, for the first time, politically acceptable. Federalists were also steeped in cameralist, Enlightenment, and utilitarian ideas. Alexander Hamilton was an avid reader of Jacques Necker (McDonald 1982: 84–5, 135–6, 160–1, 234, 382–3). The European ideological community spanned the Atlantic.

The Constitution brought major development on four of my five indices of bureaucratization, though only at the federal level. *All* federal officials have been salaried, from the late 1780s to the present day. Each department was to be rationally organized by hierarchy and function. Authority was vested in the one-man principle urged by Hamilton. Hierarchy culminated in three secretaries (of the treasury, state, and war), later joined by the post office and navy heads and the attorney general. These departments were financially responsible to the treasury and met in cabinet under the chief executive, the president. They were to submit written reports to the president and Congress, and they imposed similar reports on subdepartments. A formal separation of powers divided administration from politics, except that the chief executive was also chief politician. By contrast, state and local governments devised far more embedded administrations. But at the federal level American government offices were

¹ My main sources on American administration have been Fish (1920), White (1951, 1954, 1958, 1965), Van Riper (1958), Keller (1977), Shefter (1978), and Skowronek (1982).

intended as a full-fledged bureaucracy, the only one in the world for at least another fifty years. The international community of enlightened and utilitarian reformers hailed it as their ideal. The bureaucratic tracklayer had jumped the Atlantic.

Practice did not quite match theory. White's studies show that early administration depended as much on patron-client networks as on formal hierarchies. Reformers cut them down a little with rules governing accounting functions, contract bidding, and land grants. In 1822, Congress asked department heads to report on all employees' efficiency. The secretary of war listed his and added:

The only inefficient clerk in the Department is Colonel Henley, who is seventy-four years of age, and has been in the service . . . from the year 1775. . . . From his age he is incapable of performing the duties of a clerk, but, from his recollection of revolutionary events, he is useful in the examination of revolutionary claims. [American State Papers 1834: vol. 38, 983]

Maybe Colonel Henley was really the secretary's uncle, or maybe the department really liked hearing his stories about the Revolution. But the secretary had to account for him, as perhaps no department head in any other country yet would.

Yet personnel were not so bureaucratized and they became noticeably less so through most of the nineteenth century. They were salaried, but appointment, promotion, and dismissal criteria were fuzzy. Washington set up no rules other than against "family relationship, indolence and drink." This was progress. As Finer (1952: 332) ironically observes: In Britain the last two criteria were no barrier to office, and the first was a positive recommendation. But formal entry qualifications lagged. Qualifications and examinations were introduced in the military in 1818, but (apart from a few accountants) only in the civil service in 1853. They were not standardized until 1873 and not universal until 1883. Tenure during good behavior was the early norm but declined as the famous party spoils system developed.

All presidents had appointed political friends to office. As America democratized, notable rule gave way to party control of offices. In Jackson's watershed purge of 1828-9, 10 percent to 20 percent of all federal officials and 40 percent of higher officials were dismissed and replaced by loyalists from his Republican faction. Party purges continued through midcentury, and patronage dominated most state and local governments. Once the presidential party could subvert the bureaucracy, Congress and judiciary also intervened. Federal departments were constrained to submit budgets to congressional appropriations committees, undermining treasury centralized control. Regulating competition between parties and administrations fell onto

the courts, becoming procedural surrogates for a more bureaucratized administration (Skowronek 1982: 24-30). As British reform steadily proceeded, U.S. government bureaucracy regressed, overtaken by business bureaucracy, especially in railroads (Finer 1952; Yeager 1988).

There were three reasons why federal government lagged. First, the United States was relatively uninvolved in foreign wars and had a tiny military budget. Elsewhere, military-fiscal pressures continued to increase the size and rationalize the structure of central state administration. In the United States, the War of 1812 did force reorganization of military and accounting departments, but this tiny state had no continental rivals into the twentieth century. The Civil War enormously increased both states' size, but only temporarily, for its result left the Union unchallenged. Second came an unanticipated peculiarity. This state, constitutionally entrusted with expanding customs revenues, proved surprisingly affluent, often blessed with surpluses, needing little of the "efficient or economical organization" that Congress in theory demanded. This state felt little of the geopolitical militarism that elsewhere pressured bureaucratization.

Third, the Constitution had not solved the two distinctively political crystallizations - representation and the national issue - and this blocked a bureaucracy seen as potentially despotic. The Constitution shows that contemporaries recognized the technical feasibility of bureaucracy - well before the emergence of an industrial society. But it turned out that they did not want it. Adult, white, male Americans disagreed about what government, especially central government, should do. Political power networks crystallized in complex political factions and parties representing class, religion, economic sector, regional economies, and individual states. Indeed, U.S. politics probably saw the greatest proliferation of such pluralist interest groups. To ensure that government actually represented their interests, parties and factions restrained centralized state power and embedded themselves in multiple assemblies and offices at the federal, state, and local levels.

The "confederal" solution was chosen in the absence of any single party strong enough to control the state. As American government grew, it became fractionalized by parties institutionalized at all levels of government. Then the result of the Civil War began to produce slow and partial recentralization (still within the limits of a federal constitution). The entwined politics of class and locality-region (as well as slavery-segregation, religion, etc.) kept this state puny, divided, only feebly bureaucratized throughout the period.

France was the home of the second, more ambitious revolution. On August 4, 1789, the French revolutionaries abolished office venality

along with “feudalism.” They intended to reduce the number of offices to a small salaried core and devolve most public functions onto unpaid, committed citizens. Its rationality would be as substantive as formal, embodying the morals and values of the new citizen. But neither idealism nor economy survived revolutionary war and terror. The need to supply armies and cities, to hunt out counterrevolutionaries, and to implement many new laws re-created the bulk of the old regime state. It was now salaried, not venal, committed to rational principles of hierarchy and function and ostensibly centralized. These were major modernizations. But it fell short of its goals and of modern claims on its behalf.

“As a flood spreads wider and wider, the water becomes shallower and dirtier. So the Revolution evaporates and leaves behind only the slime of a new bureaucracy. The chains of tormented mankind are made out of red tape.” Kafka’s bitter denunciation of the Bolshevik Revolution (Janouch 1953: 71) typifies twentieth-century cynicism about the legacy of revolution – the triumph not of liberty, equality, and fraternity but of state bureaucracy and despotism. The French Revolution led toward militant nationalism and statist communism not toward liberal freedom, says O’Brien (1990). For Skocpol, the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions all increased state powers, especially their centralization and rationalization. In France the Revolution produced a “professional-bureaucratic state” existing “as a massive presence in society . . . as a uniform and centralized administrative framework,” restrained only by a decentralized capitalist economy (1979: 161–2). Tilly (1990: 107–14) claims the French Revolution provided the “most sensational move” toward centralized “direct” government. Revolutionary armies then imposed this (with regional variations) on other countries.

Yet Skocpol’s comparison with twentieth-century revolutions misleads. As we saw in Chapter 11, only at the end of the nineteenth century did state infrastructural powers develop much. They were also still restrained by competitive parties, rival state crystallizations, and market capitalism (Skocpol acknowledges this last restraint). If revolutionaries captured a twentieth-century state and abolished or bypassed the powers of capital and of party competition (as Bolsheviks and Fascists did), they might use these expanded infrastructures to increase enormously state despotic powers. But eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century revolutionaries had no such power potentiality at hand if they seized the state.

The French revolutionaries possessed, first, the distinct ideological power identified in Chapter 6. They *proclaimed* the most ambitious programs of state-led social regeneration and they could mobilize po-

litical support for them. Like the Americans, they knew in advance what a bureaucratic state looked like – borrowing cameralist mechanical models of administration (Bosher 1970: 296–7). In the fervent revolutionary climate they wiped some slates clean – abolishing office ownership and the particularisms of regional administrations at a stroke and formally replacing them with salaries and *départements*. This was important. As Tilly notes, it leveled French towns; no longer were bourgeois commercial towns subordinated to old regime administrative towns. Second, the revolutionaries centralized political representation so that dominant factions in the assembly and the two great committees could legislate for the whole of France. With these powers there is no question they modernized and bureaucratized state administration beyond old regime capacities. They aspired to direct, not indirect, rule – and in certain respects they achieved it.

Yet this did not increase the size or scope of total administration. Skocpol (1979: 199) uses Church’s figures on the increase of salaried officials to assume such an increase. But as Table 11.7 and Appendix Table A.3 reveal, the *total* number of offices probably did not rise to old regime levels until after 1850. The core ministerial personnel did proliferate rapidly from 1791 on, and the convention and Committee of Public Safety introduced salary scales and office rationalization. The key fiscal department was integrated by function and hierarchy (Bosher 1970 calls it simply a “bureaucracy” by 1794). Yet its bureaucratic criteria were mixed with party ones. When the committee regulated office qualifications, they insisted on submission of a curriculum vitae containing evidence of loyalty to the Revolution.

Moreover, the *performance* of the revolutionary state, outside of the military sphere and outside of the erratic Terror, was minimal. Margadant (1988) shows that its inability to gather taxes was pathetic. Can a fiscal administration be called bureaucratic if it manages to collect 10 percent of the taxes it demands? As we saw in Chapter 6, the revolutionary state was forced – at the height of supposed centralization under the Committee of Public Safety – to send out politically reliable *députés en mission* to lead armed bands and allowed them much tactical discretion to extract its basic subsistence needs. We clearly see its penetrative powers through the memoirs of Madame de la Tour du Pin (1985: 202). After describing her counterrevolutionary network spread throughout France, she remarks how odd it is that their correspondence was not intercepted. They lived secretly in cellars and abandoned farms, they slipped out in disguise at night to the village postbox, and then the revolutionary postal service – inherited from the old regime – did the rest. The left hand of the Terror did not know what the right hand of the postal service was doing.

Once political compromise and consolidation became possible, under the Directory and Bonaparte, some state powers stressed by Skocpol became actuality. Ministries, prefects, and salaried officials governed France under the impersonal rules of Bonaparte's civil code (Richardson, 1966; Church 1981). Woolf (1984: 168) claims that under Napoleon, France acquired an "undoubted lead" in official statistics (though I doubt the data collected were in advance of earlier Austrian statistics). It still lacked bureaucratic characteristics: no impersonal preentry qualifications, no examinations, little integration of different ministries. Ministers reported either to the Council of State, a body of loyal notables without ministerial responsibilities, or to Bonaparte himself. He resorted to the segmental divide-and-rule strategies of monarchs seeking to prevent a unified bureaucracy. He also resorted to tax-farming arrangements with private financiers, reminiscent of the old regime (Bosher 1970: 315-7). Ministerial fragmentation then survived Bonaparte. Nineteenth-century France had not one administration but plural ministries, says Charle (1980: 14). Ministers imposed their own appointment, promotion, and dismissal criteria on their departments until after the 1848 revolution.

Most pervasive of all was the French practice of embedding administration in party politics: Officials remained divided between *employés* and *fonctionnaires* throughout the century (Charle 1980). *Employés* were the descendants of old regime *commissaires*, "bureaucrats" in its slightly pejorative modern usage, middle-to-lower level officials implementing impersonal rules laid down from above by *fonctionnaires*, descendants of old regime *officiers* married (metaphorically) to revolutionary citizen-officials. *Fonctionnaires*, organized into *corps*, staffed higher administration. Like military officers they were supposed to demonstrate party commitment to common ideals. Bonaparte sought to ensure this by recruiting only young men from families of imperial notables, given in-service training. His successors also imported loyalists but favored elite generalist education through the *grandes écoles*, and from 1872 from the academy still known as "Sciences Po" (Osborne 1983). The collegial *corps* imported substantive party rationality, reducing formal bureaucratization.

As no nineteenth-century French regime lasted longer than two decades, administrative parties kept changing as top personnel in ministries, prefectures, judiciary, and army were purged. As did American elections, this brought on a party spoils system. Monarchist notables changed places with députés-fonctionnaires (Julien-Laferrrière 1970). Republicanism remained more solidly entrenched in local government, leading to midcentury conflict between central ministries and local communes, with prefects often acting as mediators (Ashford

1984: 49-68). Yet the secular drift toward Republicanism brought gradual bureaucratization. As Republican regimes institutionalized, they favored meritocracy and separated politics and administration. Competitive examinations spread after 1848, sharing the stage with informal on-the-job training and withstanding a final reaction under Louis Bonaparte (Thuillier 1976: 105-15; 1980: 334-62). Republicans finally captured the civil service in the 1880s. Now French administration became predominantly bureaucratic, though still ruled by a party collegial *corps*.

So the French Revolution, like the American, promised more bureaucracy than it delivered. The reason was the same: Party politics could not be separated from administration. Class and national politics were not yet settled. Party democracies were polymorphous, crystallizing in changing and entwined political-administrative shapes. Yet these complex administrative developments may be like a glass half drunk. We may emphasize the volume either of water or of air. Skocpol and Tilly emphasize bureaucratization and state power; I emphasize their limits. A better measure would be comparative. Had France been pushed - by revolution, directorate or Bonaparte - to greater bureaucracy than other countries? Yet the question cannot be posed this simply. As Tilly notes, revolution and its wars impacted on other states, bureaucratizing them too. States were not just independent comparable cases but interdependent units in a European geopolitical, economic, and ideological community. I continue with the cases; then I turn to their interdependence.

Chapter 4 shows that the British struggle over political representation was linked to administrative economic reform. As geopolitical militarism brought fiscal pressures, economic reform rushed ahead, carrying franchise reform on its coattails. Wartime propertied taxpayers decided "old corruption" was too expensive. The old regime reformed itself, aided by class pressure from below. Parliamentary commissioners from the early 1780s on declared against corruption, Parliament legislated from the late 1780s on, and reforming ministers whittled away from the 1790s on. The proportion of the earnings of the top twenty Home Office officials coming from salaries rose from 56 percent in 1784 to 95 percent in 1796 (Nelson 1969: 174-5). By 1832, salaries were normal, office owning virtually gone. Abolition of sinecures enabled functional and hierarchical reorganization within most departments. Legislation prohibited placemen and barred members of Parliament from holding offices. The wars brought virtual cabinet government under a prime minister responsible to Parliament. Ministers spent more time in cabinet and Parliament, leaving their departments under the control of

salariated permanent secretaries. An act of 1787 integrated the finances of departments hitherto paid out of separate earmarked funds. By 1828, all income and virtually all expenses went in and out of a single fund, its accounts presented to Parliament (although disbursements were not regulated by the treasury and remained political). By 1832, administration had been transformed (Cohen 1941; Finer 1952; Parris 1969).

On one criterion of bureaucracy Britain lagged: No standards of competence for employment or promotion were introduced until after midcentury – and even then reform was minimal. Although utilitarian and radical reformers demanded examinations and technical training, they got neither. By reforming itself, the old regime had held onto recruitment and some patronage. The impetus had been to cut administration and save money. Table 11.7 shows its success. Civil servants increased less than population between 1797 and 1830. Commissioners reported to Parliament that “old corruption” was gone and few further savings could be made. The reform movement subsided, no further bureaucratization occurring until after midcentury. The compromise endured.

In this second phase there had been two main causes of British bureaucratization. First, the traditional fiscal pressures of geopolitical militarism forced an old regime to raise taxes, cut costs, rationalize, centralize, and forget its ideological principles. Second, emerging bourgeois classes exerted a distinctively modern capitalist pressure for political citizenship and utilitarian administration. The two causes reinforced each other: The most advanced capitalist state was fighting for its geopolitical life. The resolution was a stabler settlement of old regime–emergent class struggles than in France and a more centralized settlement than in the United States. Added to the pressures of the third phase (discussed soon), this took Britain beyond the limits of bureaucracy found elsewhere. The bureaucratic tracklayer was now in offshore Europe.

After a promising beginning, Prussian dynasticism managed only limited modernization in the nineteenth century. By 1800, it was riven by party disputes. Reformers, mostly noble, though with some bourgeois professionals, sought administrative rationalization. In local administration they saw the obstacles as particularistic noble and gentry control and, at higher state levels, the court. Discreetly, cautiously, they suggested representative assemblies and a more open administration. War seemed to play into their hands. After Napoleon destroyed the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstadt in 1805–6, the monarchy sought reforms to enhance efficiency, avoid social upheaval, yet not antagonize its new French overlord. Reformers urged limited

assemblies and a single administration to run right down from a chancellor to the villages. For a short time they gained the upper hand, but by 1808 they had antagonized much of the aristocracy and the French. The bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie were too small in backward Prussia to add much popular pressure. These absolutist modernizers could do little without their monarch. To appease the French, he abandoned them.

After Napoleon's defeat, a compromise was reached (Mueller 1984: 126–66; Gray 1986). At local-regional levels little changed. Junker and church institutions survived intact until the 1848 revolution. In the central administration academic qualifications and examinations were strengthened and the universities were reformed. Nobles began to go to university, gradually reducing the old party factionalism and solidifying the national cultural integration of officials. Collegiality weakened before one-man rule. A revived Council of State now sat ministers and courtiers together, with the more expert ministers having the upper hand. During the weak rule of Frederick William III (1797–1840) power accrued to the *Beamten*, less as a rationalized bureaucracy than as Hintze's “noble-bourgeois aristocracy of service,” “feudalizing” its bourgeois members (Muncie 1944) while “enlightening” the Prussian nobility. But as absolutism revived, so did particularism. The “cabinets” revived, and *Immediatstellung*, the right of a military commander to see the king alone, was extended to civilian officials. Bureaucracy remained subordinate to whoever the monarch chose to confide in – professional ministers or noble cronies. Party conflicts reduced bureaucratic unity, splitting it apart in 1848 – civil servants and teachers were activists on both sides in that abortive revolution (Gillis 1971).

The state remained intriguing, its parties embedded in civil society. Not until class and national representation were faced squarely again, with the addition of bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, and Roman Catholics at the end of the nineteenth century, could the state modernize into the semiauthoritarianism described in Chapters 9 and 21. Prussia helped pioneer bureaucracy, but for much of the century the state as “universal bureaucracy” was Hegelian ideology, not German reality.

Austria, the first bureaucratic tracklayer, faltered earlier and more completely. Being least embedded in provincial noble power, Austrian dynastic administration was panicked most by the French Revolution and representative movements. Joseph II's successors bolted into reaction in the 1790s – the main bureaucratization now occurred in police administration (Wangerman 1969; Axtmann 1991). Defeated, though not humiliated by Bonaparte, the Austrians confined reform to

the army and leaned upon the Catholic church to mobilize support against the French. By 1815, the Austrian regime had become the hammer of reform across Europe. Chapters 7 and 10 showed this multiregional, dynastic state struggling against regional fragmenting movements. In 1867, even the royal government split into two.

This was a transitional period in the life of the state, from a predominantly military to a diamorphous military-civil state. The bureaucratic tracklaying crystallizations were changing from monarchism and geopolitical militarism to representative, national citizenship. Militarism continued to pressure toward bureaucratic efficiency, but about 1810, dynasticism had reached its bureaucratic limits, blocked by the contradiction between monarchical despotism and bureaucratic centralization and by the weakness of class pressure for citizenship. By contrast, French and "Anglo-Saxon" regimes, living in more commercialized civil societies containing extensive and political classes, institutionalized compromises among old regime, bourgeoisie, and petite bourgeoisie that allowed more party democracy and therefore more bureaucratic accountability in administration. But even there party democracy and bureaucracy were not in perfect harmony. Political parties often collided with elite technocratic bureaucracy. States remained polymorphous. Although most parties opposed old regime particularism, they were wary of state efficiency. Why give the state more efficient, cohesive, and bureaucratic infrastructures? That might aid the despotic strategy of the state elite, or it might aid rival parties. American parties changed strategies to ensure that their state became more embedded, less bureaucratic. British parties compromised. French parties compromised once the republic was saved.

What now of the Kafka-Skocpol-Tilly claim that revolution extended state power? I offer some support. Through revolution, French overtook Austrian and Prussian bureaucratization. Without revolution, France may have become an even more laggard state than Austria now became. The French state was transformed – perhaps because it had been so previously laggard and lackadaisical. But French modernization went less far than American and less thoroughly than British. The American impetus was arguably revolutionary (though Skocpol has elsewhere denied this). Yet Britain did not have a revolution, and Austria and Prussia did not lag because they lacked one. My conclusion is not that revolution was necessary to state modernization, or that it provided a unique boost to state powers (this being the argument of Skocpol and Tilly). Rather, in this phase (though not in the earlier phase) movement toward party democracy through either reform or revolution increased state bureaucracy. Unlike the Bolshevik Revolution, it was the positive, democratic side of the French Revolu-

tion, not its negative, dictatorial side, that encouraged bureaucratization. Party democracies trusted bureaucracy more because they felt they could control it. Regimes that had settled both representative and national disputes trusted it most.

To these comparative points I add another about interdependence that does increase the causal, militarist significance of the French Revolution. This fits well enough into the more general theoretical models of Skocpol and Tilly, as they both emphasize militarism in social development. Wars continued to stretch and modernize states. But the leading actor of these wars, the French Army, differed from its military predecessors. Politicized and popular, it threatened all old regimes. The effects differed between Britain and continental Europe. Militarily, Britain experienced the semitotal war that Austria and Prussia had gone through in the mid-eighteenth century, converting old regimes to state modernization. The political effects on Britain are more difficult to assess, but Chapter 4 argues that the Revolutionary and French wars advanced the merger of old regime and bourgeoisie that enabled the institutionalization of limited representative government (avoiding more popular, democratic government). In turn this enabled gradual bureaucratic modernization. So the French Revolution probably speeded up British state modernization. But the same forces may have slowed down state modernization in Central Europe. There French pressure modernized armies more than states and set back political representation, and thus also bureaucracy, by tainting moderate reformers and weak bourgeoisies and petite bourgeoisies with Jacobinism. Regimes went reactionary. Despite Kafka, Skocpol, and Tilly, the French Revolution left a decidedly mixed legacy for state development.

Phase 3: state infrastructures and industrial capitalism, 1850–1914

Chapter 11 shows that all late nineteenth-century states greatly increased their civilian scope and personnel, especially at lower and middling and at local-regional levels. Bureaucratization developed from the 1880s, struggling to keep pace with this sprawl. By 1910, Britain and France were almost as bureaucratic as they were ever to become, the United States was beginning reforms culminating in the 1920s, and the two monarchies were as bureaucratic as they could allow. In this phase there were two connected causes of bureaucratization. States institutionalized citizenship (though to varying degrees), and capitalist industrialization boosted their infrastructural powers, national economic integration, and corporate business models

This is because of Mann's def. of Bureaucracy as close to the rule of law → Bourg. Democ form.

of bureaucracy. Both tended to reduce (though not eliminate) conflict about the role of the state and the usefulness of administrative efficiency. Bureaucratization grew, with less direct opposition.

Yet the task facing would-be bureaucrats was daunting. Would the vast number of state employees be loyal to the hierarchy? Or would they represent their own private interests or those of their class or religious or linguistic community? Because much of the expansion was at the local-government level, would central coordination decline? And because no state was fully party democratic, would policy be determined by particularistic networks of academics, technocrats, and reform pressure groups scything right through formal state institutions?

Citizenship involved issues of both representation and nation, their entwinings varying by country. By 1850, the United States had institutionalized a two-party democracy for white males; yet it was entering the bitterest phase of its national struggle. While major disputes raged over the powers of the federal versus state governments, administration could not be divorced from politics. Effective government coordination at all three levels depended on party loyalty as well as bureaucracy. Under Lincoln, the spoils system reached its apogee: He removed 88 percent of all officials under presidential authority (Fish 1920: 170). The national issue was decided by force, in civil war, and then by the compromise of 1877. This reduced the political need for a partisan federal administration, though party politics returned to emasculate state and local levels in the short term. Britain and France experienced the opposite politics: more unanimity concerning the nation-state, less over (class) representation. But after the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 in Britain and the French Republican consolidation in the 1880s, those obstacles were being surmounted. All three party democracies could now locate sovereignty more precisely and then partially bureaucratize it.

The two semiauthoritarian monarchies moved less toward citizenship. In Prussia representation and nation were confronted together at mid-century. By 1880, as Chapter 9 shows, both were semiinstitutionalized. In Austria entwined representative and regional-national threats continued to politicize administration. Yet dissident nationalities were more at each other's than at Habsburg throats. (See Chapter 10.) A de facto compromise developed: Routine Habsburg central administration was allowed working autonomy, as turbulence persisted over political citizenship and over the language issue in administration.

The infrastructural growth of the state then somewhat reinforced this more consensual drift in all countries, even compensating for monarchical laggardness. Post offices and telegraph, canals, and railroads were not controversial. Schools were; for they normally involved

a relatively secular central state against local-regional churches (plus the language issue in Austria). By just after 1900 these were generally resolved in favor of the central state. Semiauthoritarian monarchies especially used state infrastructures to sponsor late development, to the general satisfaction of major power actors. (See Chapter 14.) Classes and local-regional interest groups usually favored bureaucratic efficiency in expanding lower-level and technical branches of administration. (See Chapter 11.) Once salaries or examinations were accepted as the norm in some departments, their extension was relatively uncontroversial.

From the railway boom through the Second Industrial Revolution, state and large capitalist enterprise also converged on national economies and bureaucratic organization. The national economy (described for Britain in Chapter 17) reduced local-regional differences and further "naturalized" the population. The corporate organization chart, the multidivisional corporation, and the standardized sales catalog were analogous to state statistics, line-staff divisions and treasury control: bureaucratic responses to controlling organizations of increasing size and especially of increasing functional and geographic scope (Yeager 1980). With representative and national struggles becoming institutionalized, with consensus over many state functions, and with models also provided by industrial capitalism, national sovereignty and bureaucratization expanded.

In this phase bureaucratization impacted even more on local and regional government: British counties and boroughs, American state and local governments, Austrian and German *Länder* and *Gemeinde*, French *départements* and *communes*. Most remained controlled by local office-owning or honorific notables. But infrastructural and welfare state functions generated routine local administration uncongenial to unremunerated notables. A division of labor with central administrations developed, as revenue sharing grew – though not in the federal United States.

Bureaucratization remained weakest at the top levels of central policy making, especially in Austria and Prussia. Semiauthoritarian monarchy prolonged segmental divide-and-rule party tactics and blocked integrated cabinet government. Pressure group politics proliferated because ministries, court, and parliaments all remained autonomous sources of policy making. Along with and interpenetrating the Reich and Prussian civil services grew important academic and technocratic reform associations – some called "socialists of the chair" (Rosenhaft and Lee 1990). Avoiding fragmentation depended as much on the social solidarity of these *Bildungsbeamten* as on bureaucracy. About 1900, part of the bureaucratic civil service became "colonized"

by aggressive nationalist pressure groups (see Chapter 16). The fragmentation of the state's foreign policy began in earnest – with disastrous consequences for the world (discussed in Chapter 21).

But bureaucracy also remained incomplete in party democracies. The British state now became ostensibly meritocratic. Civil service reforms were initiated from 1850 – usually to aid ministerial efficiency, without consulting Parliament where patronage still counted. Models were often drawn from British colonial practice. Internal auditing was improved. Entry and promotion on merit were instituted in 1853, boosted in 1879, and predominant by 1885 (Cohen 1941). Together with meritocratic reforms in the public schools, Oxford, Cambridge, and the church, this abolished patronage in recruitment. The top “intellectual grades” of the civil service were meritocratic, yet remained restrictive, almost all recruits coming from public or grammar schools and from the two ancient universities. Unlike Prussia, these academies were already dominated by gentry and higher professional families at the time reforms were made. Thus class composition and national solidarity of the higher civil service were confirmed (Mueller 1984: 108–25, 191–223). During 1904–14, 80 percent had been to Oxford or Cambridge.

Promotion from the lower “mechanical grades” became rare: During 1902–11, the annual promotion chance was 0.12 percent, concentrated in less prestigious departments such as customs. There were *no* promoted men in the War or Colonial Office (Kelsall 1955: 40–41, 139, 162–3). An ideology of rational, disinterested public service pervaded these men. The state was no longer an instrument of patriarchal household authority, staffed by “corrupt” patronage. Its “civil servants” were avowedly neutral, entrusted with the best interests of national civil society. Hegel's universal class of bureaucrats, always a curious concept applied to his own time and country, made a more plausible, if still ideological, appearance in the late nineteenth-century British civil service – confined within the British dominant class.

Chapter 11 shows that American government for most of the century (excluding the Civil War) was small, cheap, and easily financed. Its rapid growth in size in late century greatly expanded the spoils system and corruption, especially at the local-government level. Without bureaucratic controls, governments relied on bribery and kickbacks to get things done (Keller 1977: 245). But eventually demands for economy and efficiency arose, though much later than in Britain (Skowronek 1982). The American invention, the corporation, meant that bureaucratic models of efficiency were already available (Yeager 1980). The Pendleton Act of 1882 “classified” some federal civil service jobs – protecting them from political purges and allocating

them by competitive examination. Classified positions rose from 10½ percent in 1884 to 29 percent in 1895. Then they jumped to 45 percent the following year and to 64 percent in 1909. After World War I, they rose to more than 80 percent, where they remain today.

At first, motives behind protection were rather mixed, as parties leaving government sought to entrench their loyalists by giving them civil service status (Keller 1977: 313). But, borrowing from the corporation, the protected civil service gradually espoused the sciences of “personnel administration” (ordering of offices, careers, salaries, promotions, pensions, and efficiency reports) and “administrative management” (standardized accounting, archives and records, procurement and supply, and contracting procedures). Much of this was also implemented in northern state and local governments. The Taft Commission of 1913 drew from Chicago experience in recommending the creation of single budget and personnel bureaus to standardize federal accounts, examination and promotion criteria, position classification and salary systems, individual efficiency records, and disciplinary rules for all federal agencies. Yet neither this nor the consolidation of a single federal budget appeared until the 1920s, spurred by the administrative chaos of the American war effort (van Riper 1958: 191–223).

Much of this bureaucratization was achieved by the Progressive movement. In their administrative reforms, Progressives aimed at national “efficiency,” the ideology of a coalition between rising careerist and professional middle classes (Wiebe 1967) and corporate liberalism (Weinstein 1968; Shefter 1978: 230–7). The ideology of a neutral, efficient national executive was more than a century old. It could now finally begin to overcome party patronage and confederalism because it entwined with powerful class actors in a national civil society. It also helped that Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Taft had prior experience in civil service reform. Patronage remained – and still does today – at the top of all three levels of government. Political appointees usually have combined educational and technical qualifications with party loyalism.

Dualism also characterizes British and French top central government, and, unlike in the United States, local-regional has been subordinated to central government. The British recruited high-level civil servants almost entirely from elite public (i.e., private) schools and Oxbridge, from upper middle classes loyal to the national establishment. The French recruited theirs from *les grandes écoles* and “Sciences Po,” well educated and technically qualified but also loyal to that combination of progressive capitalism and centralized Republicanism that has characterized twentieth-century French regimes.

Top administration has remained embedded in class and national party loyalists throughout the twentieth century. All regimes fought off both confederalism and a fully fledged Weberian bureaucracy. In this period the separation of administration from politics was completed at lower and middling – and in most countries, in local-regional – official levels, but not at the top of the nation-state. The commonsense notion of the “bureaucrat” as the lower-level pencil pusher has some truth. Top state administrators remained as much political as bureaucratic, although socialization into ideologies of disinterested public service partly conceals their party politics.

Conclusion

Over the long nineteenth century, my five bureaucratic components developed as follows:

1. By 1914, almost all central, and most local-regional, officials received salaries. Office owning by hereditary right or purchase had virtually disappeared. Only part-time honorific office holding survived in large numbers at the local level.
2. Appointment and promotion by impersonal measurement of competence also developed, but rather later and still incompletely in some countries by 1914.
3. The ordering of offices within departments at first varied considerably, but by the 1880s, virtually all resembled the bureaucratic model, divided by function under a centralized hierarchy.
4. The integration of all departments into a single, centralized national administration came early to the United States, which then regressed strongly away from it. It came later in Britain and France and had not come fully to Germany and Austria by the end of the period under discussion.
5. The insulation of party politics from administration came latest. At the top of central government it remained incomplete everywhere, but was feeblest in Germany and Austria.

Thus some bureaucratization on all five criteria occurred in all countries through the period. In 1760, states were not remotely bureaucratic; by 1914, national bureaucracy and administrative insulation were institutionalized, increasing state infrastructural powers and, to a much lesser extent, the internal cohesion of their civil administrations. Central state administrations had moved toward becoming unitary, either as semiauthoritarian – with bureaucrats implementing the decisions of monarchical regimes – or as party democratic – with bureaucrats implementing national parliamentary legislation.

Bureaucratization was everywhere preceded by its ideologies. Cameralism, the Enlightenment, utilitarianism, Progressivism, and

other middle-class radicalisms came mainly from highly educated officials from the old regime and professional middle classes. All advocated what they called “rational administration” and what we would call bureaucracy. It is striking how conscious bureaucratization was, how it was clearly formulated throughout the West by ideologists before it was implemented. Ideologists could be persuasive partly because much bureaucratization was functional. It was an efficient cost-cutting response to administrations growing vastly in functional and geographic scope and diversity. Because ideologists communicated internationally, power actors in one country usually read of improved bureaucratic techniques in other countries before they adapted them at home (though I have not systematically researched this). The modern bureaucratic state appears as first imagined, then inexorably, functionally, in reality.

Yet an examination of states in detail modifies such appearances. Viewed from close up, the rise of modern state administration was not evolutionary or one-dimensional. Structural causes differed between periods. Ideologies proved ineffective without these causes, which also influenced ideological shifts (from cameralism to utilitarianism to radicalism, etc). Each one of my countries led bureaucratization at different periods, its surge then failing to surmount new barriers. I distinguished three phases in bureaucratization, dominated by (1) monarchical and militarist crystallizations, (2) representative and national citizenship crystallizations, and (3) the industrial capitalist crystallization. Underlying this was the transformation of the modern central state from being predominantly military to being diamorphous – half-civil, half-military.

Civil administration was the most important way state elites penetrated civil society. It was also, in 1760, the most important form of party penetration into absolutist states and perhaps even into party-democratic states (along with parliamentary assemblies). No eighteenth-century state possessed effective infrastructures to back up its formal despotic power over civil society because “its” civil administration was actually riddled with the ownership rights of dominant classes and churches. After the earlier military revolution, military administrations were not quite so riddled, somewhat more controlled by the state (Chapter 11 shows that the state then lost some control to a partially autonomous military caste).

From such military controls, pressured by war, dynasts launched the first bureaucratic offensive. However, their bureaucratic elements were entwined with, and restrained by, both segmental divide-and-rule strategy and dependence on old regime parties. In the second, transitional phase, pressured by popular (largely class-based) citizen movements as

well as by war, revolutionary and party-democratic regimes took the lead and swept away "corrupt" office owning. But this second bureaucratic offensive also had limits, because such regimes did not satisfactorily solve enough of their major representative and national problems for them to be able to trust a cohesive, efficient, centralized bureaucratic state. In the third industrial capitalist phase some regimes made further progress in institutionalizing centralized party democracy and so could further bureaucratize. But bureaucratization, especially at lower and middling levels of administration, was now also aided considerably by the addition of new and largely consensual state infrastructures assisting national industrialization (and also national military rearmament). Only top administrative levels resisted full bureaucratization, as regimes continued to need party loyalists.

Civil administrations did not lose much cohesion, and they may even have gained some, as they grew during the period – but with two qualifications. First, cohesion was less a characteristic of an autonomous state than a relation between state and civil society – as I suggested it might be in Chapter 3. Whether states could act effectively and cohesively depended as much on officials being embedded in and expressing the national cohesion of dominant classes as on their own bureaucratic capacities. The form of this embedding and expression changed greatly through the period, from particularistic, predominantly decentralized office holding to supposedly universal and predominantly national meritocracy.

As Table 4.2 suggests, eighteenth-century Prussia and Britain were examples of states expressing relatively cohesive national civil societies and thus being infrastructurally effective. The old regime French state was less effective because it expressed (and contributed to) the incoherence of its society. And the Austrian state was about as effective as a highly autonomous state *not* embedded in its civil society could be, which is not very effective. Much later the three party-democratic states became more effective as they became genuinely representative of (males in) the dominant and nationally organized classes of early industrial society, especially of capitalists and the professional middle class. We have found little of *the* state as an autonomous actor, as suggested by elite theory. Where the state was relatively cohesive, this was mainly because central state actors remained embedded, if more universalistically, in civil society power networks, principally in national classes. Where state actors had more autonomy from civil society, they had difficulty in acting cohesively. Chapter 3 notes that autonomous earlier states (e.g., the feudal states) had usually been cohesive but feeble. Perhaps autonomous political power in modern

society is actually the autonomy of the party factionalized state. Chapter 20 supports this suspicion.

Second, states were not fully unitary because their power networks extended beyond the departments of civil administration discussed in this chapter. Their armed forces were somewhat autonomous, somewhat more embedded in old regimes than were civilian administrators. Their diplomatic corps were even more old regime and closer to the supreme executive power of the state. Monarchical courts and political parties (of class, sector, locality-region, and religion) added their distinct factionalisms, social embeddings, and presumed capacities to coordinate some of this. Civil administrators' ability to coordinate all this was only moderate. As we saw, coordination of their own plural departments remained their weak points. Either they did coordinate, but through party loyalties as much as through bureaucracy – in which case they too might be a source of divisiveness – or they did not – in which case their own professional and technocratic capacities were applied to purposes defined more by a narrower technocratic-bureaucratic state crystallization than by the needs and purposes of the "whole" state. Chapter 14 discusses such possibilities.

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14 The rise of the modern state: IV. The expansion of civilian scope

Chapter 11 identifies two sea changes in the development of the state. The first, lasting through the eighteenth century to 1815, saw great expansion in the state's size, due almost entirely to its geopolitical militarism. Earlier chapters show this greatly politicized social life intensifying the development of classes and nations. The second sea change is the concern of this chapter. Beginning about 1870, it greatly expanded not only size but civilian scope within the state as well. While retaining (a reduced) militarism plus traditional judicial and charitable functions, states acquired three new civilian functions, around which, as Chapter 13 shows, bureaucratization also centered:

1. All states massively extended infrastructures of material and symbolic communication: roads, canals, railways, postal service, telegraphy, and mass education.
2. Some states went into direct ownership of material infrastructures and productive industries.
3. Just before the end of the period, states began to extend their charity into more general welfare programs, embryonic forms of Marshall's "social citizenship."

Thus states increasingly penetrated social life. Despite a reduction in fiscal pain, civil society was further politicized. People could not return to their normal historical practice of ignoring the state. Class-national caging continued, if more quietly, with less world-historical drama. Social life was becoming more "naturalized," and states were becoming more "powerful" – but in what sense? Were autonomous states "intervening" more despotically in civil society, aided by greater infrastructural powers, as envisaged by elitist-managerialist state theory? Or was state growth merely a functional and infrastructural response to industrial capitalism? This might increase not state but civil society's collective powers (as in pluralist theory), or it might subordinate the state to the distributive power of the capitalist class (as in class theory). Or were these enlarged, more diverse states now more polymorphous, crystallizing in plural forms between which "ultimate" choices were not made? And if they became more polymorphous, did they also become less coherent?